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DANCES WITH NONLAWYERS: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON LAW FIRM
DIVERSIFICATION
GARY A. MUNNEKE*
In this Article, Professor Munneke continues the debate over ethical rules gov-
erning lawyers' professional affiliations with nonlawyes, arguing in favor of the
adoption of uniform rules that regulate lawyers' conduct in the context of specific
ethical issues, such as confidentiality and conflicts of interest. In Professor Mun-
neke's view, the retention of ethical rules that prohibit law firm diversification
impedes the ability of lawyers to compete effectively in today's rapidly changing
marketplace of professional services.
Professor Munneke moreover questions whether state bar association rules that
prohibit law firm diversification are capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny
under the federal antitrust laws and the First Amendment. According to Profes-
sor Munneke, a substantial question exists as to whether the state action exemp-
tion should apply to shield these rules from antitrust attack Professor Munneke
further asserts that First Amendment theories offreedom of association and com-
mercial speech may impel less restrictive alternatives to the current regulatory
scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
A S the practice of law in the United States becomes increasingly com-
plex, new systems for delivering legal services have proliferated.
From legal services programs for the poor to in-house corporate law de-
partments, lawyers have struggled to develop effective mechanisms to
make legal services available to clients. Of the many new approaches to
providing legal services, however, none has generated as much contro-
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
versy as the movement launched by a significant number of law firms to
provide ancillary business services in conjunction with traditional legal
services. The outcome of this battle over law firm diversification will
shape the face of the practice of law in this country for the next century.
This Article analyzes the current debate and proposes a resolution to this
controversy that both ensures the long-term growth of the legal services
industry and fosters professionalism.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Change in the Profession
The practice of law has changed dramatically in recent decades. Re-
search on the legal profession indicates significant shifts in the profes-
sion's demographics' which have served as an item of discussion in
scholarly journals.2 The problem of change and how to cope with it has
also been addressed introspectively by bar associations which have held
numerous conferences dealing with these issues.3 Moreover, this mod-
em-day evolution has been shaped and reflected by the decisions of the
courts.4
Fundamental questions are being asked today about the practice of
law. As the profession has grown larger in number5 and court decisions
1. The American Bar Foundation Lawyer Statistical Report documents the growth
of the profession from 221,605 in 1951 to 542,205 in 1980, and projections indicate that
the United States will have over 1,000,000 lawyers by the year 2000. See Barbara A.
Curran, American Bar Foundation, The Lawyer Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile
of the U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s, at 3-4 (1985). The profession is increasingly
female; the female lawyer population has grown from about 5,500 in 1951 to approxi-
mately 83,000 in 1984. See id. at 9. The percentage of sole practitioners has declined
from about 46% in 1960 to about 33% in 1980. See id. at 14. The number of large firms
has increased dramatically; an ABA survey shows that the number of firms with more
than 100 lawyers has increased from four in 1960, to more than 200 in 1988. See William
H. Rehnquist, The State of the Legal Profession, 14 Legal Econ., Mar. 1988, at 44, 44.
2. See, e.g., Susan Raridon, The Practice of Law-The Next 50 Years, Legal Econ.,
Apr. 1989, at 31, 33 (predicting that the past "hot areas" of practice of the 1970s and
1980s, including energy law, health care, bankruptcy, computer law, international trade,
pensions, and tax, will give way to communications, intellectual property, employment,
environmental, government relations, and lobbying in the 1990s, and forecasting that in
the next 50 years the areas of practice will include space law, ocean law, and other areas
not prominent today).
3. Indeed, a central theme of many conferences on the legal profession is that the
practice of law is changing rapidly, and that lawyers must understand the causes of such
change in order to respond. See American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Task Force on the
Role of the Lawyer in the 1980's, at 2 (1981); Law and the American Future (Murray L.
Schwartz ed., 1976); William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A
Blueprint for the Justice System in The Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 278
(1978).
4. See e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977) (considering
disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from advertising); Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir. 1975) (considering whether
attorney should be disqualified from court proceeding because of conflict based on former
representation of client's adversary).
5. The question of whether there are "too many lawyers" is not a new one. Those
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have opened the door for lawyers to use new techniques in marketing
their services,6 law firms have significantly expanded the scope of the
services they provide.7 Concurrently, an increasing number of law
school graduates have pursued careers outside the private practice of
law,8 frequently in fields where they utilize their legal training but are not
required to maintain bar membership.9 Lawyers who have practiced in
these fields have often tended to "legalize" their work by using a legal
approach to analysis and problem solving. In some areas of practice,
lawyers may eventually push nonlawyers out of the field.
who claim that the practice of law is overcrowded always seem to represent a view that
the late Professor Robert McKay described as "the last lawyer into the room, shut the
door." Remarks at the National Conference on the Role of the Lawyer in the 1980s (Jan.
1980). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
6. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(letterhead designation of specialty); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (advertising); In re R-M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (same); Bates, 433 U.S. at 350
(same).
7. The fact that legal advice incorporates extralegal elements is acknowledged in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1984) [hereinafter Model Rules]. "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be
relevant to the client's situation." Id Comments to this rule state as follows:
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of
another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the profes-
sional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business
matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profes-
sion or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in an-
other field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer
should make such a recommendation.
Model Rules, supra, Rule 2.1 cmt. This admonition implicitly recognizes the notion that
legal problems are seldom purely legal problems, and that the resolution of complex is-
sues usually requires more than purely legal advice. See Raridon, supra note 2. at 33.
8. The 1988 Employment Report and Salary Survey produced by the National Asso-
ciation for Law Placement indicates that 4.8% of law school graduates responding to the
survey were employed in full-time nonlegal positions. See National Ass'n for Law Place-
ment, Class of 1988 Employment Report and Salary Survey 1 (1990). Although the term
"nonlegal" is imprecise, it is clear that many law graduates do not practice law. There
are no competent sources of information on how many practicing lawyers leave the active
practice of law, but extrapolation from the 1980 Statistical Report and legal education
statistics suggests that the actual number is substantial. Another survey in 1985 found
that 13% of all law school graduates held nonlegal positions. See Leona M. Vogt, From
Law School to Career: Where Do Graduates Go And What Do They Do? A Career
Paths Study of Seven Northeastern Area Law Schools 9 (1986). Furthermore, an ABA
Young Lawyers Division survey found that 7.8% of the respondents intended to changejobs outside of law within the next two years. See Ronald L. Hirsch, Are You on Target?,
12 Barrister, Winter 1985, at 17, 18. Whether these lawyers actually left the profession is
unknown.
9. These "law-related" careers include a number of fields utilizing legal training but
not requiring bar membership such as accounting/tax law and real estate. See generally
Frances Utley with Gary A. Munneke, Nonlegal Careers for Lawyers: In the Private
Sector (2d ed. 1984) (discussing alternative career paths); Deborah L Arron, Running
From the Law: Why Good Lawyers Are Getting Out of the Legal Profession (1989)
(nonlegal career alternatives); Ellen Wayne, National Ass'n for Law Placement, Legal
Careers: Choices and Options (1982) (alternative career paths).
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Just as lawyers have entered many nonlegal professions, a substantial
number of nonlegal enterprises now offer law-related services. 10 Fre-
quently, these service providers compete with law firms for the same cli-
ents and work. In some areas they have squeezed out the legal
practitioners. 1
The result of these developments has been a blurring of the line be-
tween that which is the practice of law and that which is not. Although
lawyers retain a monopoly on the representation of clients in court, many
other services are up for grabs.2 Ironically, lawyers in private practice
often find themselves competing with other lawyers who are employed by
nonlegal organizations. The response of some firms has been to hire
nonlawyers with expertise in law-related areas to help them compete ef-
fectively against nonlegal business entities.
Historically, the organized bar has challenged competing nonlegal ven-
tures by attacking them as having engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.' I3 The bar associations in many jurisdictions created unauthor-
ized practice committees to monitor the activities of nonlegal organiza-
tions that have encroached upon the domain of practicing lawyers.' 4
10. Many certified public accounting firms provide a tax section comprised of legally
trained individuals who support the delivery of accounting services to clients. Although
the tax section is not considered to be engaged in the practice of law, there is nevertheless
an overlap between the tax planning work of C.P.A.'s and the legal tax work of lawyers.
See Utley with Munneke, supra note 9, at 18-19, 44. As another example, banks operate
trust departments in which the trust management functions frequently have legal over-
tones. If the bankers, who are often lawyers, also assist clients with financial planning,
they are likely to engage in work similar to that of a single practitioner. See id. at 22.
Likewise, insurance companies that provide estate planning services may do almost
everything that lawyers do, short of drafting wills and trusts. See id.
11. The most obvious example is in the real property field. In many jurisdictions, title
companies have absorbed the bulk of residential real estate transfers by providing a less
expensive service than lawyers. Practicing lawyers have lost the real estate market for all
but the most complicated, adversarial, or large closings. See Gary Taylor, Practicing Law
on the Borderline, Nat'l L.J., May 28, 1990, at 3, 3.
12. See generally Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, 571 F.2d 205 (4th
Cir.) (dispute regarding state bar association's proper role in adopting and enforcing dis-
ciplinary rules concerning the unauthorized practice of law), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941
(1978); In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910) ("corporation can neither
practice law nor hire lawyers to carry on the business of practicing law for it").
13. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences
Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 159,
160 (1980); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1981).
Although Christensen and Rhode differ somewhat in their views as to when the organ-
ized bar became aggressively involved in the enforcement of unauthorized practice regu-
lations, both agree that the protection of lawyers' economic interests has been a major
tenet of the bar's agenda for approximately 50 years. The ABA was one of the first
organizations to outlaw, and then police, the unauthorized practice of law. It formed a
Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law to perform these functions.
See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the
Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 Hastings L.J. 577, 583 (1989).
14. From 1937 through 1978, the ABA Standing Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law formulated "Statements of Principles" concerning accountants, archi-
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These committees have fallen into disfavor, however, for a number of
reasons including a series of legal setbacks,15 the threat of antitrust chal-
lenge posed by the Federal Trade Commission, 6 and the increasingly
unclear distinction between the practice of law and the pursuit of related
fields.17 In the wake of these committees, a more laissez-faire, free mar-
ket environment has evolved." In this new environment, both lawyers
and nonlawyers have experimented extensively with new delivery
systems.19
In order to appreciate this movement by law firms towards ancillary
business ventures, it is important to understand the changes in the legal
profession that have occurred in recent years. For much of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, the vast majority of lawyers practiced
alone or in very small firms.2' These lawyers offered services that were
personal to their clients.2" Clients tended to hire lawyers on the basis of
personal loyalties. Increasingly, however, the attorney-client relation-
ship has become more institutional than personal.' Along with the de-
tects, banks, claims adjusters, collection agencies, insurers, engineers, publishers, title
companies, realtors, and social workers that charted the appropriate sphere of activities
for each profession in relation to the legal profession. These efforts were designed to
ensure than nonlawyers did not practice law. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 584.
15. See Rhode, supra note 13, at 55-62.
16. Many statements of principles formulated by the ABA were rescinded because of
successful antitrust challenges. See James Podgers, Statements of Principles" Are They on
the Way Out?, 66 A.B.A. J. 129, 129 (1980). "[Ninety-six percent] of state bar associa-
tions had unauthorized practice committees in 1976." Rhode, supra note 13, at 15. Ac-
cording to the chairman of the ABA's unauthorized practice committee, this percentage
has decreased primarily because of antitrust concerns. See id.
17. See David Lauter, 'Outsiders' Who Work for Firms, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 6, 1984, at 1,
32 (discussion with consultant Robert Weil) ("In the past... 'the psychology of the
profession' has been to 'step back from the line' separating law from other fields. More
recently, that reticence has been diminishing.").
18. See id (discussion with regulatory economist Jim J. Tozzi) ("'[L]aw is increas-
ingly multi-disciplinary,'.., requiring 'a range of services' to represent a client. 'Econo-
mists and any of these others,' [accountants, lobbyists, engineers, etc.] ... 'were always
brought in on an ad hoc basis, but if you're an integral part of the firm, it adds another
dimension.' "); Rosalind Resnick, Looking at Alternative Services--The Lawyer/Non-law-
yer Wall Continues to Erode, Nat'l L.J., June 10, 1991, at 1; Taylor, supra note 11, at 3.
19. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
20. See Curran, supra note 1, at 13.
21. During the first two-thirds of this century, the legal profession was a "close-knit
fraternity of like-minded practitioners who shared a strong sense of common values and a
general disdain for any efforts to commercialize the profession." James W. Jones, The
Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year 2000, 41 Vand. L Rev. 683, 683
(1988). Lawyers believed that law, as a profession, was "a branch of the administration
of justice and not a mere money-getting trade." Id at 683-84. "The loyalty lawyers felt
toward their firms was mirrored by the fidelity of their clients, who valued stability over
cost effectiveness." S.S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of Law Firm Profit-
ability, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 185, 189 (1990).
22. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 Tex. L
Rev. 1269, 1274-79 (1980). Professor Schwartz discusses a number of negative effects
produced by this "bureaucratization of the legal profession," including the change in
lawyer loyalty from clients to employers, see id at 1278-79, the "attenuation of the local
general professional community as the lawyer's reference group for norms of practice and
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personalization of client services, a more permissive marketing
environment 23 has encouraged law firms to expand their services in
search of new clients.24
Competition and shrinking profits have further applied pressure on
law firms to find new sources of revenue.2" Clients have reinforced this
businesslike environment by demonstrating less loyalty to preexisting
professional relationships, and changing firms when the price is right. 6
Many law firms have responded to the competitive atmosphere of the
1980s by broadening the scope of the services they offer. Often this has
resulted in an expansion of services beyond the practice of law. One ex-
ample of this is the creation of estate planning departments that service
the needs of general business or litigation clients. Frequently, this has
also produced a broadening of the scope of services offered to clients in
general. The law firm, for example, to further service a client engaged in
lobbying activities, might make available the skills of research analysts,
economists and other consultants in conjunction with the services offered
by the legal team. Moreover, in a commercial land acquisition, the law
firm might supply a variety of professionals including engineers and envi-
ronmental consultants to expedite the deal.
It is a commonly accepted practice for a law firm to go into the mar-
ketplace and purchase nonlegal expertise to provide competent services
for individual clients.27 Little controversy is generated when a law firm
retains a salaried professional to provide a specific nonlegal service to a
professionalism ... [and the] decline in self regulation of the bar." Id. at 1269. Compare
Professor Schwartz' assessment of the demise of professionalism to that of former ABA
President Justin Stanley, who chaired the ABA Commission on Professionalism. See
Justin A. Stanley, Lawyers In Business, 8 N. Il. U. L. Rev. 17, 22 (1987) ("[L]awyers
and law firms seem to be drifting from an attitude of professionalism toward one of com-
mercialism."); id. at 26.
23. Although Supreme Court cases such as Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977), speak of advertising, a concept that many practitioners resisted, the buzzword
"marketing" did not bring with it the same connotations of sleazy ambulance chasing.
Advertising is one approach to marketing legal services, but every lawyer or law firm that
seeks to find new clients or retain old ones engages in marketing, regardless of whether
advertising is used or not. This shift in thinking and the implications generated by it were
first observed by Lori Andrews in her groundbreaking work. See Lori B. Andrews, Birth
of a Salesman: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation 85 (1980) [hereinafter Birth of a
Salesman].
24. See Kathy Brock, Competition is the Catchword for Professional Services, The
Business Journal-Portland, January 7, 1991, at 11; W. Ward Reynoldson, The Case
Against Lawyer Advertising, 75 A.B.A. J. 60 (1989).
25. See Donna K.H. Walters, Partners Under Pressure, L.A. Times, July 7, 1991, at
D1. A new source of income for many firms has been the providing of ancillary services,
such as economists and lobbyists, to clients. Law firms face a growing demand from
increasingly sophisticated clients who are shopping harder for law firms to provide
broader services. See Thomas F. Gibbons, Law Practice in 2001, 76 A.B.A. J. 68 (1990).
26. "More sophisticated clients are divvying up their business to several service prov-
iders based on specialties... rather than using one firm for all of their services-a trend
observers expect will continue." Brock, supra note 24, at 13.
27. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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class of clients with similar needs.28 When the nonlegal services, how-
ever, extend beyond mere contract work or employment arrangements,
the role of nonlawyers expands and many lawyers become very ner-
vous.2 9 The current debate on ancillary business activities arises in to-
day's competitive environment. Each side in this debate has its own view
of the proper nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Before further ex-
amining this debate in Section III, it may be helpful to review the regula-
tory framework governing the lawyer-client relationship and examine
some of the experimental arrangements that have been employed by law-
yers to expand the scope of their services within a confining regulatory
scheme.
B. Regulation of the Marketplace
Law firms that wish to provide legal and nonlegal services to clients do
not enter a regulatory vacuum. Ethical rules restrict the ability of law
firms to provide services ancillary to the practice of law. This regulatory
net defines the types of arrangements that law firms may establish.
Lawyers are hampered in their efforts to diversify by traditional no-
tions of law practice and by longstanding ethical prohibitions against
business entanglements with nonlawyers.3° Ethical rules provide that a
lawyer may not "form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activ-
ities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.""1 In addition, the
lawyer may not "share legal fees with a nonlawyer,"3 2 give anything of
value to a nonlawyer for recommending the lawyer's services, 33 or permit
28. See Andrews, supra note 13; Lauter, supra note 17.
29. An example of this fear may be found in a message from ABA President Stanley
L. Chauvin to members of the association:
[Tihe mixing of law practice with non-law business could open the flood gates
for outside regulation of the profession.... I truly doubt that lawyers who
create ancillary businesses are motivated by a desire to serve clients or the pub-
lic more effectively .... The risk of putting the lawyer-client relationship in
jeopardy appears to be motivated by profit.
Stanley L. Chauvin, Jr., A Conscientious Conclusion: Ancillary Business too Risky for
Clients and Lawyers (Message from the President), 76 A.B.A. J. 8, 8-9 (1990).
30. Although the Model Rules and the predecessor Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (1969) [hereinafter Model Code] do not prohibit all business combinations
involving lawyers and nonlawyers, one treatise notes:
While the Comment to Model Rule 5.4 asserts that the Rule expresses tradi-
tional limitations on sharing fees, to protect the lawyers' professional judge-
ment, substantial portions of Rule 5.4 are best read as a continuation of an
attempt to restrict lawyers and nonlawyers from working together if legal serv-
ices will be rendered in the joint venture.
1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice 256 n.7 (3d ed. 1989).
31. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
103(A).
32. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
102(A).
33. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.2(c); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-
103(B).
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a nonlawyer to direct the lawyer's independent professional judgment.34
Moreover, the lawyer may not practice in an association authorized to
practice law for a profit, if. "(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein,
... ; (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof, or (3) a
nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of
a lawyer."'3 ' Furthermore, the lawyer shall not assist a non-lawyer to
engage in the unauthorized practice of law. 36 In addition, rules that re-
strict in-person solicitation of business 37 and protect client confidences 38
necessarily place limitations on lawyers' dealings with nonlawyers. Col-
lectively, these rules have kept lawyers out of nonlegal activities, and
have likewise kept nonlawyers from providing legal services. 3
These regulations are now giving way to more permissive rules gov-
erning joint lawyer-nonlawyer ventures, and such activities appear to be
evolving with or without the imprimatur of the organized bar.4' Part II
of this Article reviews the current debate over lawyers' ancillary business
34. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(c); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-
107(B).
35. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(d); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-
107(C).
36. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.5(b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
101(A).
37. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-
103(A).
38. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.6; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 4-101.
39. See Harry J. Haynsworth, Marketing and Legal Ethics: The Rules and Risks 120
(rev. ed. 1990); Andrews, supra note 13, at 600. Both Dean Haynsworth and Professor
Andrews conclude that this regulatory net has been effective in preventing joint business
ventures between lawyers and nonlawyers for the providing of legal services.
40. Both the District of Columbia and North Dakota have considered a plan to allow
nonlawyer participation in law firms. The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the
following bar recommendation that was designed to liberalize Model Rule 5.4 so as to
allow the sharing of fees, and the formation of partnerships with nonlawyers, provided
that certain ethical safeguards were maintained:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except
that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partners, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the
lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a de-
ceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of
the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the de-
ceased lawyer; and
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation
or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on the
profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activi-
ties of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) A nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representa-
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activities. It remains to be seen whether the organized bar can formulate
workable solutions to this intractable problem, given the divergence of
opinion that prevails. Regardless of what the formal bar ultimately de-
cides, new delivery systems will continue to be forged by entrepreneurial
lawyers.41 To the extent that these innovative practices infringe upon
traditional concepts of the nature of lawyering, new rules may be ham-
mered out by court decisions when these practices are challenged.
Frequently, careful planning allows lawyers who engage in joint ven-
tures with nonlawyers to traverse the ethical obstacle course unscathed.
In practice, the ethical rules have proved to be mere snares for the un-
wary, not barriers to all ancillary business activity, and, as a result, inno-
vative practice arrangements have continued to develop. 2
There are strong arguments for the repeal of some, if not all, of the
tive of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a
reasonable time during administration;
(2) A nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) A nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of
a lawyer.
North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (Proposed Draft 1986).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has adopted a rule permitting nonlawyers
to become partners in law firms:
(a)(4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of organiza-
tion which meets the requirements of Paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the or-
ganization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal serv-
ices to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest
undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer par-
ticipants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under
Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(a)(4), (b) (1990).
41. See Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, 738 F. Supp. 288, 290 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (unin-
corporated association of lawyers, paralegals and lay persons that answered legal ques-
tions of the general public), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992); Florida Bar v.
Consolidated Business and Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797, 798-99 (Fla. 1980) (com-
pany owned entirely by nonlawyers that employed both lawyers and lay persons to de-
liver legal services to the general public); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Gold Shield,
Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1233-34 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1975) (group legal services plan whereby
member lawyers were made available to provide legal services to subscribers of the plan).
42. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, More than the Law: Ancillary Business Growth Con-
tinues, 78 A.B.A. 3. 54, 56 (1992) (discussing the steps law firms have taken to avoid
problems including conflict checks, disclosure statements, and special retention agree-
ments). Despite the obstacles, firms with ancillary businesses represent "a growing move-
ment. A 1991 survey by Phyllis Weiss Haserot, president of New York's Practice
Development Counsel, identified 80-85 ancillary businesses operated by law firms-up
from about 65 in 1989." Id at 55.
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rules that govern lawyers' business relationships with nonlawyers.4 a
Most notably, a removal of the economic restrictions resulting from the
current rules could allow lawyers to compete more effectively in the free
market environment of today's business world. Such changes might ac-
tually help law firms survive in the coming decades.
C. Experimentation in the Marketplace
It has long been commonplace for small town lawyers to engage in
ancillary business activities. These businesses have often been operated
out of the same office as the law practice.' Office sharing arrangements
with nonlegal businesses, where a lawyer and a nonlawyer share clients,
if not fees, have also been commonplace. 45 In the past, professional disci-
pline was periodically meted out against lawyers who used these arrange-
ments to solicit clients indirectly by feeding the law practice with clients
from the ancillary business.46 For the most part, such practices were
ignored by disciplinary officials provided that the lawyer's conduct was
not egregious.47
In a small town, where there might not be enough legal work to keep
lawyers busy full-time,48 some relaxation of the rules against affiliations
with nonlawyers has served a practical purpose. By permitting lawyers
to engage in ancillary business activities and thereby supplement the in-
come they received from their law practice, legal services have been made
available to people who would otherwise not have access to a lawyer.49
In larger communities, where the competition has been greater and
there has been enough legal work to sustain full-time law practices, many
of the reasons that make ancillary businesses attractive in small towns do
43. See infra part II.
44. See Haynsworth, supra note 39, at 80.
45. It would be impossible to catalogue all the different business arrangements involv-
ing small-town lawyers and providers of nonlaw services. A lawyer might own a real
estate or insurance agency. A real estate law firm might own a title company or maintain
an interest in a local bank. A lawyer who was also a certified public accountant might
operate a joint law/accounting practice. A real estate or insurance agency, instead of
being operated by the lawyer, could simply occupy a suite in the same office building, and
perhaps share support staff and overhead expenses. A car ride through almost any rural
county evinces the prevalence of these practices. An interesting description of the phe-
nomenon appears in the Litigation Section Recommendation and Report to the House of
Delegates on Ancillary Business Activities of Lawyers (1990). Although the Litigation Sec-
tion opposed the idea of ancillary business generally, the Report carved out a small town
exception because the practice was so entrenched. See id. at 3, A-7.
46. See In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 78-81, 86, aff'd, 521 P.2d 497 (Alaska 1974);
Florida Bar v. Curry, 211 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 981 (1968); In re
Depew, 524 P.2d 163, 164-66 (Idaho 1974); In re Miller, 131 N.E.2d 91, 93-95, 97 (11.
1955).
47. See John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Struc-
ture of the Bar 345-46, 350 (1982). The close-knit legal community in a small town could
enforce informally what the formal disciplinary process ignored. Such cohesiveness is
absent in more urban settings. See id. at 346-47, 350.
48. See Haynsworth, supra note 39, at 80.
49. See id.
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not exist. Urban lawyers have tended to view attempts by their counter-
parts to diversify into nonlegal or law-related businesses as being a form
of unfair competition. Before the ban on legal advertising was declared
unconstitutional, any foray by law firms into business ventures that could
generate new clients for the firm was considered unethical." Even after
the Bates decision,"1 there remained an undercurrent of feeling among
lawyers that extra-legal services were unprofessional. As a result of this
dichotomy between large and small communities, a regulatory scheme
has been maintained despite the fact that its provisions seldom have been
enforced in smaller communities. 2 Thus, there has been a double stan-
dard of enforcement.
Ironically, the same ethical considerations confront both the sole prac-
titioner and the large law firm partner. Problems involving loyalty, con-
fidentiality, and solicitation apply with equal force to the small and large
firm. The only distinctions between the two lie in the economic stakes.
If small firms and sole practitioners are able to engage in ancillary busi-
ness activities without violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, then
large firms should be able to do the same. But ethical pitfalls do exist,
and arguably these are more pronounced in larger organizations. The
better solution may be to regulate lawyers' conduct in the context of spe-
cific ethical issues, such as confidentiality, rather than prohibiting
prophylactically an entire genre of associations.
Separate standards should not be employed for ancillary businesses op-
erated by large and small law firms. If there are no valid reasons for
prohibiting small firms from engaging in ancillary business ventures, it
follows that no absolute bar should be imposed upon large firms either.
More importantly, the distinctions between sole practitioners and large
firms, or between small towns and big cities, are analytically meaningless.
The fact that an issue is more pressing in one setting than another does
not lead to the conclusion that different rules are necessary. Although
conflicts of interest may be more difficult to identify in a firm of five
hundred attorneys than in a firm of five, the standard for determining
when a firm should withdraw or be disqualified should not differ.5 3
Similarly, the distinction between law-related and nonlegal business
activities should be discarded. Although the dividing line between "non-
50. See Birth of a Salesman, supra note 23, at 1.
51. The Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977), dis-
cussed "The Adverse Effect on Professionalism" as one of the arguments offered by the
Bar Association in support of retaining the ban on advertising. The Court's response
clearly articulates its antipathy towards the Bar's position. Bates, however, did not put to
rest the sentiment that professionalism was under attack.
52. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
53. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1975), dealt with the conflict of interest problems inherent in large law firms. Neither the
Code nor the Rules mentions any special provisions applicable to lawyers practicing in
large or small firms. The court in Silver Chrysler Plymouth does, however, acknowledge
that associates in large firms may not have access to confidential information in such a
manner that would later require their personal disqualification. See id. at 756-57.
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legal" and "law-related" is obscure at best, some of the enterprises com-
monly referred to as law-related include real estate agencies, insurance
agencies, investigation agencies, and accounting firms. 54
A practicing lawyer engaged in a business venture extrinsic to the
practice of law should be careful not to allow that venture or its clients to
interfere with his professional responsibilities to the law practice or its
clients. The lawyer must conduct her law practice according to the stan-
dards of the applicable Rules or Code, and conform her conduct outside
the practice to standards of integrity and honesty.55 The lawyer's busi-
ness activities, as well as personal conduct, may be subject to constraints
imposed by the ethical standards. This is true regardless of whether the
activity is characterized as legal or law-related.
It is virtually impossible to draw a meaningful line between nonlegal
and law-related activities. Although some activities could be character-
ized as law-related more easily than others, it is difficult to imagine any
activity that could not be considered law-related under any circumstance
because almost every field of human endeavor has some legal ramifica-
tion. In the absence of a meaningful distinction between lawyers' respon-
sibilities vis-A-vis nonlegal and law-related work, line drawing becomes a
true exercise in futility. The rest of this Article, therefore, will not dwell
on this distinction, but rather will refer to all business activities by law-
yers outside of the practice of law as "nonlegal."
The most common form of ancillary business activity occurs when the
lawyer or law firm owns a nonlegal business. The lawyer may or may not
have partners or joint venturers for the nonlegal enterprise. The nonlegal
business, moreover, may or may not operate in conjunction with the law
business. In addition, advice that the lawyer gives to clients or customers
of the nonlegal business will contain varying degrees of legal content and
thereby subject the nonlegal business to prosecution for the unauthorized
practice of law. The critical element in each situation is that the lawyer
is in a position to exercise control over the policy or management of the
nonlegal business.56 The lawyer need not be involved in the actual man-
agement of the business, but, in any event, the lawyer's financial invest-
ment would place him in a position to exercise control."
54. Arguably, in the law-related scenarios the nexus between the two fields of work is
close enough that clients of the law-related activity might become clients of the legal
practice. In a nonlegal business, on the other hand, there is no connection with the legal
business (e.g., a practicing lawyer may own a restaurant). This distinction unfortunately
confuses rather than clarifies the situation.
55. See In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 85 (Alaska), aff'd on reh'g, 521 P.2d 497
(Alaska 1974).
56. Thus, mere financial investment in a company, such as the purchase of non-con-
trolling shares of stock, would not fall within the scope of this definition.
57. The Model Rules do not prohibit lawyer investment in outside business. A law
firm may own its building and rent out space in it, operate a restaurant or travel agency,
or invest in all manner of unrelated businesses. Model Rule 1.8 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or know-
ingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest ad-
[Vol. 61
LAW FIRM DIVERSIFICATION
When a lawyer engages in a nonlegal business, various ethical issues
arise in addition to the general duties of honesty and integrity. Included
among these are such ethical issues as unauthorized practice, conflicts of
interest, confidentiality, and solicitation. The nonlegal business presents
a potential threat to the integrity of the legal profession because it ex-
poses lawyers to an opportunity to violate their professional ethics. But,
as is the case with conflicts of interest in general, a potential conflict does
not necessarily require withdrawal or disqualification.58
A subset of the lawyer-owned, nonlegal business is the joint practice,
where the lawyer herself is certified in another field such as accounting,
real estate or medicine.59 In the course of an interview with one client,
the lawyer may simply change hats, or vice versa. While dual training
permits a lawyer to provide a broader range of services, traditionally it
was feared that a dual practice would allow lawyers to improperly funnel
nonlegal clients to the law practice. As Dean Haynsworth has noted,
however, many earlier restrictions against dual practice have given way
verse to a client unless: (1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client; (2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek
the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and (3) the client consents
in writing thereto.
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.8(a). Thus, business dealings with clients may be
subject to discipline. The conflict involves the clients' interests, not the joint venture per
se. The joint venture, however, is explicitly prohibited to the extent that a lawyer may
not make a nonlawyer a partner in a law practice. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule
5.4(b),(d). These same rules apply when the law firm enters into a business relationship
with a nonlegal business such as a title company or investigator. Other concerns, how-
ever, including conflicts, confidentiality, and improper solicitation, render the lawyer's
business dealings with his clients susceptible to criticism in additional ways.
58. Perhaps the best approach is to view ancillary businesses as conflicts. The Model
Code contains the clearest statement of this concept in DR 5-101(A) which states:
Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgement on behalf of his
client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, prop-
erty, or personal interests.
Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-101(A). The Model Rules also address outside busi-
ness activities in Rule 1.7:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client con-
sents after consultation.
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.7(b). Under a conflict of interest analysis, a lawyer
would be required to both ascertain whether the activity in question compromised any
ethical duties to present or former clients, and obtain the affected clients' consent. See
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rules 1.7, 1.9.
59. One of the first medical-legal law firms in the country was formed in the early
1980s, in which all the partners had both J.D. and M.D. degrees, and continued to prac-
tice their medical specialties as well as the law. See Gail Appleson, Combining Law and
Medicine, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1983, at 10.
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to a more permissive rule.'
A variation on the joint practice theme is the office sharing arrange-
ment, where the legal and nonlegal activities are independently owned
and operated. Suppose ABC law firm shares office space with XYZ con-
sulting group. XYZ employs a number of consultants and ABC engages
primarily in business planning work. Although each entity operates
under its own lease, an overlapping management team provides common
support services such as word processing, reception and billing. Is it a
problem if ABC and XYZ informally refer clients to each other, or if
ABC utilizes consultants employed by XYZ as experts in its cases?
Probably not.
In this example of an informal arrangement, the law firm may be able
to avoid transgressing any of the rules that pertain to its business deal-
ings with nonlawyers.61 If, however, the law firm and consulting practice
were to share fees formally, or form a partnership, the arrangement
would be ethically impermissible for the lawyers.6" Such a venture
would subject the lawyers to disciplinary action even if the arrangement
were more economically viable than the informal arrangement described
above.
Suppose instead that ABC law firm holds an economic or controlling
interest in the consulting group. 63 As long as the law firm does not vio-
late any ethical rules, particularly those covering dealings with nonlaw-
yers, such an arrangement would be permissible.'
Similarly, the law firm could hire the consultants as employees of the
firm to do work in conjunction with the firm's cases, and could even
share profits through a qualified pension or profit sharing plan.65 Yet,
the law firm could not give the consultants a share of its legal fees," and
arguably could not take a share of any consulting fees for services pro-
vided independently by the consultants.67
These scenarios illustrate the unusual constraints dictated by the pres-
ent rules. Lawyers walk an ethical tightrope whenever they contemplate
60. See Haynsworth, supra note 39, at 121.
61. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rules 5.4, 5.5; Model Code, supra note 30, canon
3.
62. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a), (b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR
3-102(A), DR 3-103(A).
63. This example is, in fact, an ancillary business.
64. The converse, of course, would not be true because nonlawyers are prohibited
from holding an economic interest in a law firm. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule
5.4(d)(1); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-107(C)(1).
65. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a)(3); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
102(A)(3).
66. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
102(A).
67. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
102(A). This particular proposition may be the subject of some debate, the counterargu-
ment being that the firm is not improperly sharing fees with the ancillary business since
none of the activities of the nonlegal business involve the practice of law.
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any form of multiprofessional practice, and the plight becomes more pre-
carious when they cede power and income to nonlawyers. At the same
time, sophisticated practitioners can devise ways to avoid taking an ethi-
cal fall while deriving substantially all of the benefits of a joint venture.
Looking at the situation in reverse, it is well settled that a lawyer who
is employed by a nonlegal entity cannot provide any legal services to
clients of that nonlegal organization.6 8 For instance, a J.D./C.P.A. in
partnership with another C.P.A. could not offer legal services to the
C.P.A. firm's clients, although he could give legal advice to the account-
ing partnership itself. Moreover, the nonlegal organization could not
own or invest in the law practice.69 Furthermore, ethical rules prohibit
partners in a law firm from selling their practice to a C.P.A. firm."0
In summary, under the present regulatory scheme law firms can oper-
ate subsidiaries that provide nonlegal services. Law firms, however, can-
not operate in such a way that they themselves offer both legal and
nonlegal services, except where those nonlegal services are ancillary to
the practice of law. Nonlawyer ownership of or control over the delivery
of legal services is generally prohibited. Thus, true multiprofessional of-
fices remain beyond the range of feasibility, despite the fundamental ap-
peal of the concept of holistic problem solving centers." t
A separate question related to nonlawyer participation in law firms has
arisen in a sphere separate from the delivery of legal services, namely, the
area of law firm management. As law firms have grown larger and more
complex, lawyers have learned (sometimes the hard way) that adminis-
tering the law firm interferes with practicing law. Increasingly, lawyers
have employed professional managers to handle administrative responsi-
bilities previously directed by attorneys.7 2 Hiring nonlawyer profession-
als to manage the firm presents some of the same problems as hiring staff
professionals to support the delivery of legal services. Law firm manag-
ers inevitably gain control over important policy decisions of the firm,7"
and this may constitute control over the lawyers' independent profes-
sional judgment. Professional level administrators are likely to expect
financial incentives beyond straight salary, and this may be viewed as fee-
68. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910); Haynsworth, supra note
39, at 97-98.
69. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(b), (d); Model Code, supra note 30, DR
3-103(A), DR 5-107(C).
70. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(b), (d); Model Code, supra note 30, DR
3-103(A), DR 5-107(C).
71. If institutions could develop, bringing many professions under one roof, they
could draw on the talents of individuals of varied backgrounds and "have as their mission
the broader goal of problem solving." James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock. The
Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the Century, 64 Ind. L.J. 461, 465 (1989). Despite
the fact that multiprofessional offices have been discussed for several years, the chilling
effect of the ethical rules has prevented widespread experimentation with the concept.
72. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 628.
73. See id at 629.
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splitting with a nonlawyer.74 Thus, the internal pressure from profes-
sional level administrative staff for more flexible compensation arrange-
ments and greater control over decisionmaking evokes many of the same
issues as the ancillary services problem.75
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE
A. Business or Profession
Despite strong arguments that professionalism and business are not
contradictory concepts, many practicing lawyers have become increas-
ingly troubled by the changes they are witnessing and experiencing in the
legal marketplace." Their disaffection has not been limited to the spe-
cific issue of lawyers in business with nonlawyers, although law practice
diversification has been one of the many "evils" contributing to the per-
ceived demise of professional standards.
Recent debates on the question of ancillary business activities have fo-
cused on whether law is a business or a profession.77 Adherents to the
"law is a profession" position have lamented the demise of traditional
standards of ethics, civility, and public service.7" They view creeping
commercialism as the root of the problem.79 "Law as a business"-that
is, a money-making trade-is seen as the antithesis of the public service
ideal upon which the legal profession was founded.80
The idea that professionalism is grounded in public service has its
roots deep in the history of Anglo-American law. In the distant past
when the French speaking Norman kings dispensed justice to an Anglo-
74. See id. at 628.
75. See id. at 629.
76. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training
and Certification of Advocates Essential to our System of Justice?, 42 Fordham L. Rev.
227, 239 (1973) (if lawyers fail to maintain standards of professionalism themselves, they
may lose traditional prerogatives such as self regulation); supra note 120 and accompany-
ing text.
77. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Law's Both a Business and a Profession, Nat'l L.J., Oct.
24, 1988, at 13.
78. See, e.g., Peter Megargee Brown, The Quiet Revolution in the American Law Pro-
fession: Remarks Before the Commission on Professionalism of the American Bar Associa-
tion, 14 Fordham Urb. L.J. 855, 868 (1986):
The atmosphere has become that of a Baghdad flea market: the blatant touting
and puffing of wares; legal gossip publications stoking the flames of the business
mentality within the profession while selling law office computer equipment and
marketing client-building seminars. The current barbarians may well be the
newly anointed "Manager-Accountants" who run the machine. They talk ear-
nestly about the "real world"-their world. Their creed is the printout, the
computer, and the bottom line. Their caterwaul is, "nothing is forever, not
clients, not partners, not anything .. " All this despite centuries of history.
79. See, e.g., Stanley, supra note 22, at 22 ("[L]awyers and law firms seem to be drift-
ing from an attitude of professionalism toward one of commercialism.").
80. See Brown, supra note 78, at 867. Brown and Stanley both view the profession's
trend toward a more businesslike orientation as a threat to such fundamental values as
public service, loyalty to clients, and ultimately the bar's power of self regulation.
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Saxon populace, it was necessary for parties to be represented by some-
one who could speak the language of the court."' These representatives
were inevitably nobles who served out of fealty to their king. For such
early advocates, service rather than profit was the reason to assume this
role. English barristers today do not accept a fee, but rather receive an
"honorarium" in acknowledgement of this tradition of public service. s8
While public service should be considered one of the main pillars of
professionalism, it is not the only one. Education, status, and power are
others.8 3 And so is money." In the American legal profession today,
there are very few individuals who come to the bar with sufficient per-
sonal resources that they do not need to receive remuneration for their
work. 5 Furthermore, for at least the last century, legal education has
been viewed as a pathway to upward mobility for generations of immi-
grants' children. 6
It is simply a myth to say that lawyers do not work for money, or that
money making is not an inherent component of professionalism. The
belief that practicing law can provide a lifestyle better than that of an
assembly line worker or migrant farm laborer is fundamental to many
practicing lawyers.8 7
If part of being a professional involves making money, then the busi-
ness aspects of practice are not inimical to professionalism; rather, they
are inherent in it. This does not mean that making money should be-
come the sole motivator for attorneys, or that unfettered greed should
have any place in the concept of professionalism. In fact, the concept of
professionalism implies a fair monetary return, as well as other privi-
leges, in exchange for special responsibilities including public service.
It is certainly appropriate to speak of a "duty of public service" for
lawyers, based upon longstanding traditions in the legal profession. 8 It
is equally appropriate to discuss the professionalism of the business side
of law, integrating the professional responsibilities of lawyers with the
81. See I Frederick Pollock & Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law 85
(2d ed. 1898).
82. See Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 169 (1953).
83. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 1.5, at 14-15 (1986).
84. See idL at 15.
85. In 1990, most law school graduates accepted positions with salaries ranging from
$22,800 to $81,000. See National Ass'n for Law Placement, Class of 1990 Employment
Report and Salary Survey 12 (1991). Although some individual graduates may possess
substantial resources, and may not need to work for a living, it is improbable that this
number is large.
86. See Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to
the 1980s, at 74-75 (1983).
87. See Wolfram, supra note 83, § 1.5, at 14-15.
88. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 6. 1, urging lawyers to perform public interest
legal service. The background to this section states: "Lawyers have traditionally as-
sumed an individual obligation to provide legal services to those unable to afford them."
Id Rule 6.1 cmt. (citations omitted). Despite the admonition in the Rules and the ten-
dency of many lawyers to engage in pro bono activities, an obligatory duty to provide
public service has never existed in the legal profession.
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right to compensation. To consider law to be either a business or a pro-
fession, that is, as mutually exclusive alternatives, makes no sense histori-
cally, theoretically or practically. It is time to put this red herring to
rest.
The proper inquiry ought to be: When lawyers earn money from the
practice of law, what limitations does professionalism place on their
money-making activities? Some of the restrictions are fairly obvious-a
lawyer must charge a reasonable fee;89 a lawyer must segregate and ac-
count for clients' funds separate from her own;90 a lawyer should engage
in pro bono public service;91 a lawyer may not solicit business from stran-
gers face-to-face in an intrusive way;9 2 a lawyer should withdraw from
representing a client if his personal business interests interfere with his
independent professional judgment.93
The subject of ancillary businesses operated by law firms has generated
a hue and cry among many practicing lawyers who are calling for a pro-
hibition of these new forms of association with nonlawyers. In the name
of professionalism, the opponents of law firm diversification have de-
nounced these innovative business arrangements as a threat to the tradi-
tional values of the legal profession. 94 This outcry is not likely to end
soon. Contemporaneously, other lawyers have supported the develop-
ment of such new forms of practice. 95 This debate will continue to pit
powerful segments within both the organized and practicing bar against
each other.96
Unfortunately, the rhetoric of advocacy has obscured the real issues
highlighted by these new forms of practice. The opponents of diversifica-
tion present a litany of horrors that might come to pass if law firms are
allowed to go into business with nonlawyers. 97 Their logic seems to be
that if enough bad things could occur from business entanglements with
89. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.5; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-106.
90. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.5; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 9-102.
9 1. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 6.1. There is no comparable section of the
Model Code.
92. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3; Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-104.
93. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.7(b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-
101(A).
94. See L. Harold Levinson, Making Society's Legal System Accessible to Society: The
Lawyer's Role and Its Implications, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 789, 791 (1988). The ABA has
weathered such divisive issues as abortion and the Vietnam War, but these were external
political questions. The ancillary business debate goes to the heart of lawyers' concept of
themselves as professionals. The adversaries in this battle are unlikely to change their
minds or their practices because of a vote of the ABA House of Delegates.
95. See Jones, supra note 21, at 688-92.
96. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 622. For example, James W. Jones, a leading
advocate for more relaxed rules governing law firm affiliations, is a partner at Washing-
ton's powerful Arnold & Porter, while Dennis Block, who has lead the opposition, is a
partner in New York's Weil Gotshal & Manges. This dichotomy is typical of the division
within the ABA on this issue. See Randall Samborn and Marianne Lavalle, ABA in
Atlanta: Subsidiaries, Dan Quayle Dominate, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3, 31.
97. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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nonlawyers, then all such dealings are inappropriate. By banning such
business arrangements, the multitude of horrors could not take place and
professionalism could be maintained.98
On the other side, proponents of diversification seem to gloss over the
very real dangers that exist when law firms expand their services beyond
traditional legal assistance to clients.99 The reality is that potential
problems involving lawyers' responsibilities to clients may present signifi-
cant difficulties, but a prophylactic rule to solve the problem is overkill.
Perhaps more importantly, the real issues in this dispute are, as Profes-
sor Andrews has concluded, economic ones."co Those law firms that
have resisted expanding the scope of their services are in direct competi-
tion with firms that have pursued more aggressive policies of attracting
and servicing clients.
B. The Evolving Marketplace
To understand this competition among firms, it is necessary to ex-
amine the evolution of large firm practice in the United States. Prior to
1970, the legal marketplace was dominated by a handful of large firms in
each major city, with the largest concentration in New York City.101
During the 1970s and 1980s, these firms expanded rapidly to keep pace
with the growing appetite of large corporate clients for legal services.102
Between 1982 and 1987, fees for legal services increased from
$34,325,371,000 to $66,997,543,000 (an increase of 95.2%).103 Firms
grew to meet the needs of their clients, and an increasing number of me-
dium-sized firms grew into large firms operating competitively in the
same market. During the 1980s, as businesses expanded, practice areas
such as corporate mergers and acquisitions, and commercial real estate
boomed. 4
98. See Levinson, supra note 94, at 805, 807.
99. "The primary objective of any lawyer should be to deliver quality work and ser-
vice. The ownership of the organization where that lawyer works has nothing to do with
quality or service." Thomas S. Clay, Yes Excellence Must Be Rewarded, 76 A.B.A. J.,
May 1990, at 38, 38.
100. Professor Andrews recounts the history of the "business canons," the term that
he uses to describe the ethical rules governing business associations with nonlawyers. See
Andrews, supra note 13, at 579-600. He concludes that an important basis for these rules
is economic protectionism. See id. at 622. Nevertheless, he argues that the rules are not
subject to either constitutional or antitrust attack. See id. at 617-21. According to An-
drews, the best prospects for changing the rules come from the states themselves, Con-
gress, or the Federal Trade Commission. See id. at 656. The question of a legal challenge
to these rules is addressed further in Part III of this Article.
101. See Daniel J. Cantor, Law Firms Are Getting Bigger... and More Complex, 64
A.B.A. J. 215, 215 (1978).
102. See Steven Brill, A Boom in Premium Deal Work, Am. Law., Jul.-Aug. 1989
(Supplement), at 6; Jones, supra note 21, at 687.
103. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Pub. No. SC87-A-52, 1987
Census of Service Industries, table 3a at US-20 (1990).
104. See Emily Couric, Specialties: What's Hot, What's Not, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 3, 1986,
at 1, 26-28 (hot areas identified in early 1986 include general corporate/securities, bank-
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The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona "5
translated into more than a go-ahead for legal advertising. It meant that
firms could actively market their services to prospective clients. 106 Long-
standing professional relationships were no longer sacred. Clients had
more firms from which to choose, and, thus, attorneys who actively
sought clients, and who offered an array of services to attract them, had
a distinct advantage in the marketplace. Conversely, firms that could not
compete in this new, diversified environment fell upon hard times, and
lawyers who were not "rainmakers" lost influence in their
organizations. 10
7
One approach to change that many firms found attractive was expan-
sion into new geographical markets. One of the first mergers on a na-
tional level was between Kutak, Rock of Omaha, and Huie, Brown & Ide
of Atlanta.108 These two firms recognized the value of a national prac-
tice. In the ensuing years, many firms opted to establish branch offices in
Washington, D.C., various state capitals, and cities where their clients
had offices." 9 This geographical expansion placed new pressures on lo-
cal firms, since clients of the out-of-town firm could utilize a branch of-
fice of their retained firm as opposed to traditional local counsel. 10 It is
likely that the expansion of out-of-state firms into the Washington, D.C.,
market had a direct bearing on the decision of many D.C. firms to enter
into ancillary business ventures. In addition to producing additional in-
come for the law firms, the operation of nonlaw businesses enabled the
firms to offer a wider range of services than their competitors."'
ing and real estate); Craig Endicott, 100 Markets Diversity for Growth, Advertising Age,
Dec. 8, 1986 at S-2, S-3 ("The biggest growth area in Atlanta is commercial real estate [in
1986]."); Ellen L. Rosen, The Large-Firm Boom Continues: A 10-year Look, Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 28, 1987, at S-2, S-26, ("Skadden's expertise in mergers and acquisitions was the
'engine driving the firm' to quadruple in size.").
105. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
106. See Birth of a Salesman, supra note 23, at 12-13.
107. As competition increases and other firms develop new areas of specialization, in-
ternal tensions increase, more lawyers have less to do, and non-performers and former
rainmakers get defensive. See Chris Bridge, Proposal from Chris Bridge: Firm Leadership
Must Be Confident and Committed, Am. Law., Dec. 1990, (Pullout Management Re-
port), at 25. When law firms merge, only those considered rainmakers-"those with a
well-established client list and ability to bring in new business"-are absorbed by the new
firm. Joan Vennochi, Two Boston Law Firms Talking of a Merger, The Boston Globe,
Aug. 23, 1990, at 57.
108. See Mitchell Pacelle, Kutak after Kutak, Am. Law., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 33, 103.
109. See Angel Castillo, New York Lawyers Branching Out To Florida, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1980, § 1, at 1; Andrew W. Lehren, Outside Firms Making Mark in Philadel-
phia, Phila. Bus. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3B; see also Paul F. Bellows, Branches: Key to
Growth, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 26, 1988, at S-13 (discussing growth of branch offices).
110. Law firms are becoming nationwide to better serve their clients in other parts of
the country. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 463.
111. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. This was particularly significant in the
legal market of Washington, D.C., where clients frequently required services that tran-
scended the bounds of traditional law practice. It also remained true in rural areas, and
became relevant in a widening circle of jurisdictions. Had ancillary business simply been
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As the 1980s drew to a close, the frenzy of legal activity that charac-
terized the decade diminished. Changes in the stock market, investment
banking, and corporate takeovers chilled the corporate legal market." 2
This slowdown produced a ripple effect in many other areas of practice.
As a result, competition among law firms intensified even more. Head-
lines in the legal press told the story of numerous old-line, silk-stocking
firms closing, splitting up, or merging into other entities.'" 3 It would be
unusual today for any large firm to escape a close introspective examina-
tion of its institutional identity, client base, and future.
Not surprisingly, in an effort to compete in this new environment,
some firms chose a more conservative direction than others, and resisted
expansion into nonlaw businesses. These firms have become staunch op-
ponents of diversification, and vice versa."1 4 If the debate were simply
which approach is most economically efficient, we could leave it to free
market forces. The debate, however, now implicates the propriety of
lawyers' conduct and calls into question the fundamental requirements of
professionalism. Hence, it becomes necessary to explore the two
positions.
C. The Law Firm Diversification Battle
The advent of the diversification movement was heralded as early as
1980, with a report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Professional Standards, also known as the Kutak Commission.' The
discussion draft of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
recommended the adoption of Rule 7.5.16 The Kutak Commission's
a D.C. concern, it is unlikely the issue would have engendered the national acrimony that
it has. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
112. See Michael Bradley, The Party's Over, Phila. Bus. J., Jan. 7, 1991, § 1, at I
("Those in the mergers and acquisitions business are working harder on fewer transac-
tions."); Jones, supra note 21, at 684-86; Michael Quint, The Dicey Future at Chase Man-
hattan, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990, § 3, at 1, 6 ("More recently, the big banks have been set
back by the drop in the commercial real estate market and a sharp slowdown in the very
profitable, albeit risky, business of financing mergers and acquisitions.").
113. See Stephen Labaton, Old-Line Law Firm Agrees to Biggest New York Merger,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1988, at Al; Dana Leonard, Howdy Partner Arizona Law Firms
Join National Trend, Catch Case of Mergermania, Ariz. Bus. Gazette, Jan. 2, 1989, § 2, at
1; David Margolick, Prestigious Law Firm on Wall Street to Split, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,
1982, § 2, at 27.
114. It may sound cynical to assert that the philosophical positions of the adherents
followed the economic ones, but a review of the support for the opposing positions in the
ancillary business debate suggests that this is the case. It would be naive to suggest that
Dennis Block and Justin Stanley, leading opponents of diversification, are not as econom-
ically vested in the outcome of the issue as James Jones, the leading proponent. Their
firms have cast their lot with a narrow definition of law practice that precludes diversifi-
cation into nonlegal areas. If they lose the political battle, the economic war may be
decided as well.
115. The "Kutak Commission" was the nickname for the ABA Comm'n on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards, named for its chairman, Robert J. Kutak. See Andrews,
supra note 13, at 593.
116. The proposed rule permitted nonlawyers to maintain an interest in a law firm
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proposal represented a much more liberal view of business affiliations be-
tween lawyers and nonlawyers than was contemplated under the existing
Code of Professional Responsibility. 17 In the initial skirmish, support-
ers of the traditional rules prohibiting lawyers from becoming entangled
with nonlegal entities successfully prevented the adoption of proposed
Rule 7.5."11 The ABA Model Rules as finally adopted continued the
Code's blanket prohibitions against business arrangements with
nonlawyers.
The first real salvo of the present battle was sounded in 1986 by an-
other ABA commission, the Commission on Professionalism (or the
Stanley Commission, as it was called, in recognition of its chair, former
ABA President Justin Stanley)." 9 The report of the Stanley Commission
addressed a number of issues suggesting that there had been a decline in
professionalism among lawyers. On the issue of ancillary businesses, the
Commission wrote:
The Commission has been disturbed by what it perceives to be an
increasing participation by lawyers in business activities. The activities
take several forms....
It seems clear to the Commission that the greater the participation
by lawyers in activities other than the practice of law, the less likely it
is that the lawyer can capably discharge the obligations which our pro-
fession demands. The Commission views the trend as disturbing and
urges the American Bar Association to initiate a study to see what, if
any, controls or prohibitions should be imposed.' 20
provided that the firm upheld specific ethical requirements. The proposed rule read as
follows:
A lawyer shall not practice with a firm in which an interest is owned or mana-
gerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, unless services can be rendered in
conformity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. The terms of the relation-
ship shall expressly provide that:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judg-
ment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(b) the confidences of clients are protected as required by Rule 1.7; and
(c) the arrangement does not involve advertising or solicitation prohibited by
Rules 9.2 and 9.3 [presently Rules 7.2 and 7.3 respectively]; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a client a fee which violates
Rule 1.6 [presently Rule 1.5].
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.5 (Discussion Draft 1980). This formula is
very similar to the one rejected in North Dakota. See supra note 40.
117. The "Kutak Commission" spent five years reformulating the prior Model Code.
Its proposed Rule 7.5 held a very different view on associations between lawyers and
nonlawyers than the Code.
118. This proposed rule was successfully opposed based on several objections: the pro-
posal would permit Sears, Montgomery Ward, H&R Block, or the big eight accounting
firms to open offices in competition with traditional law firms; nonlawyer ownership
would interfere with a lawyer's professional independence; nonlawyer ownership would
destroy a lawyer's ability to be a professional; and it would have a fundamental but un-
known effect on the legal profession. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 595.
119. See American Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Professionalism, ".... In the Spirit of Pub-
lic Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986).
120. Id. at 30-31.
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Since a number of major law firms were already experimenting with
ancillary businesses, being told that they were not professional did not sit
well at all. In fact, the District of Columbia Bar Association disregarded
the Stanley Commission's report and adopted amendments to its Rules of
Professional Conduct that allowed nonlawyers to become partners with
lawyers in law firms."'
Meanwhile, the Stanley Commission Report led to the creation of a
Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism whose mission was
to consider, among other things, business affiliations between lawyers
and nonlawyers. The Professionalism Committee conducted hearings,
published a newsletter,' 2 and discussed the issue. The general consensus
of this bipartisan group was that law firm diversification should be regu-
lated but not prohibited outright.123 A minority report by Dennis Block
of the Litigation Section took the opposite position that ancillary busi-
ness should be prohibited as contrary to the tenets of professionalism.' 24
The minority view was presented to the ABA House of Delegates in a
separate report from the Litigation Section Committee on Ancillary
Business."
25
The House of Delegates declined to adopt the Litigation Section's rec-
ommendations.1 26 Instead, in August 1990, it referred the question to
the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.""7
The Ethics Committee, after holding hearings and receiving written com-
ments, issued a draft proposal for a new Model Rule 5.7 that recognized
ancillary business activities, and attempted to clarify the ethical obliga-
tions of lawyers who engage in such ventures. 2  Failing to address the
issues of fee splitting or nonlawyer partnerships, the proposal simply pro-
121. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
122. See, eg., The Professional Lawyer (Special Coordinating Committee on Profes-
sionalism, American Bar Ass'n Center for Professional Responsibility) Summer 1989
(newsletter).
123. See Working Group On Ancillary Business Activities Interim Report to the ABA
Special Coordinating Committee On Professionalism 1 (1990).
124. See American Bar Association Litigation Section Recommendation And Report
To The House Of Delegates On Ancillary Business Activities Of Lawyers 1, appendix
(1989) (minority report by Dennis J. Block).
125. See id This effort was also lead by Dennis Block, who perhaps concluded that it
would be a better strategy to take the offensive through a section resolution, rather than
wait for his adversaries to act.
126. See Summary Of Action Taken By The House Of Delegates Of The American
Bar Association: 1990 Midyear Meeting 7-8 (1990).
127. See American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional
Responsibility: Special Coordinating Committee On Professionalism Report To The
House of Delegates 11 (1990).
128. The final text of the proposal after much tinkering was as follows:
(a) A lawyer who provides, or whose law firm provides, representation to cli-
ents, and who is also associated, or whose law firm is also associated, with an
ancillary business entity:
(1) shall initially disclose in writing to all customers of the ancillary business
entity the nature of the relationship between the lawyer or law firm and the
ancillary business entity; and
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vided that lawyers could operate ancillary businesses (which most ob-
servers conceded could be done already), but fell short of permitting
nonlawyer investment in legal services. Under the proposal, a firm could
operate an ancillary consulting firm or hire consultants to serve as sala-
ried employees of the firm, but it could not name the consultants as part-
ners in the firm or share fees with them other than indirectly through a
qualified compensation plan. 29 The proposal thus accomplished an
anomalous result. While the economic interests of lawyers were pro-
tected, no protection was afforded to the economic interests of nonlawyer
consultants, who were prevented from maximizing the value of their
(2) shall treat a customer of the ancillary business entity in all respects as a
client under the Rules of Professional Conduct, unless:
(i) the ancillary service is unrelated to any matter in which representation is
provided by the lawyer or the law firm to the customer as a client of the
lawyer or law firm; and
(ii) the lawyer or law firm directly or through the ancillary business entity,
has first clearly communicated to that customer by means including written
disclosure, that the relationship between the ancillary business entity and the
customer is that of non-legal business and customer, not that of lawyer and
client.
(b) In the circumstances in which a customer of an ancillary business entity is
required to be treated as a client pursuant to paragraph (a) (2):
(1) a lawyer who is a partner in the law firm associated with the ancillary busi-
ness entity shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the entity has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct with respect to that cus-
tomer of all those employed or retained by or associated with the entity con-
forms to the Rules of Professional Conduct;
(2) a practicing lawyer associated with the ancillary business entity who has
direct supervisory authority over persons employed or retained by or associated
with the entity shall make reasonable efforts to assure that their conduct with
respect to that customer is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer;
(3) a practicing lawyer associated with the ancillary business entity shall be
responsible for conduct with respect to that customer of a person employed or
retained by or associated with the entity that would be a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer and if:
(i) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(ii) the lawyer is a partner in a law firm associated with that entity or has
direct supervisory authority over the person and knows of the conduct at a
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take re-
medial action; and
(4) if the lawyer reasonably should know that the ancillary business entity is
not complying with any obligation imposed by the Rules of Professional Con-
duct with respect to the provision of ancillary services to such customers, the
lawyer shall dissociate from the entity unless the entity immediately rectifies the
situation.
American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional Responsibil-
ity: Recommendation And Report To The House Of Delegates 3-4 (1991) (Proposed
Model Rule 5.7).
129. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. The limits of this provision in regard
to the inclusion of nonlawyers in pension or compensation plans has not been fully ex-
plored. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a)(3); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
102(A)(3). A firm arguably could avoid the restriction on fee splitting imposed by Rule
5.4, by making profit based payments through the compensation or retirement plan.
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services in the marketplace if they wished to engage in joint ventures
with lawyers.
The Ethics Committee Report argued that three basic ethical issues
are involved: confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and interference with
the lawyer's independent professional judgment.3 0 The Committee did
not suggest that one of the problems was improper solicitation. To have
done so might have subjected the proposal to the criticism that it was
merely concerned with economics. Alternatively, the Committee may
have concluded that Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 were sufficient to protect
against improper solicitation through a nonlawyer affiliate.13 1 The Com-
mittee failed to explain why other ethical rules were insufficient to cover
the remaining ethical issues.
Not surprisingly, this report did not satisfy either side in the debate.'
Some of those who supported the ancillary business concept may have
felt that the proposal created an abstruse web of restrictions that simply
rephrased the existing rules without broadening the range of permissible
ancillary business activities, thereby obfuscating the issue. Opponents
may have objected to the proposal's tacit acceptance of the concept of
ancillary businesses and its failure to address problems involving con-
flicts, confidentiality and confusion.
The Litigation Section offered an alternative proposal prohibiting law
firms from offering ancillary services, in whatever form, to anyone not
already a client of the firm. 133 That rule would effectively close the door
to most external ancillary businesses, and severely restrict in-house pro-
vision of ancillary services.
Both sides characterized their dispute as a choice between regulation
and prohibition."M In one of the closest and most controversial votes in
the ABA in recent years, the House of Delegates, after rejecting the Eth-
ics Committee proposal, adopted the Litigation Section rule by a vote of
197 to 186.135 After the vote, the winners hailed the victory as a signifi-
cant one, while advocates of diversification minimized the potential im-
130. See American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional
Responsibility: Report To The House of Delegates 14 (1991) (summarizing the Ethics
Committee's study of lawyers' ancillary business activities).
131. See id.
132. See id (Minority Report Of Ralph G. Elliot, Minority Report Of William C.
McClearn).
133. See American Bar Association Litigation Section Recommendation And Report
To The House Of Delegates 1-2 (1991). Most significantly, the 1991 version differed from
the earlier Litigation Section proposal by dropping the so-called solo-practitioner excep-
tion which had allowed individual practitioners to operate ancillary businesses. See
American Bar Association Litigation Section Recommendation And Report To The
House Of Delegates 2 (1990). The exception had been criticized as an inconsistency that
illustrated the inappropriateness of a prophylactic rule. See supra note 44 and accompa-
nying text.
134. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, ABA Rejects Ancillary Business Inroads on Client
Confidences, 60 U.S.L.W. 2121, 2122 (Aug. 20, 1991).
135. See id.
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pact of the decision. 13 6
In August 1992, the ABA House of Delegates, by a seven vote margin,
repealed Model Rule 5.7137 before any jurisdiction had adopted it. It
remains to be seen what effect this vacillation will have. Some states may
yet adopt some variation of Rule 5.7 while others may fashion more lib-
eral rules along the lines of Washington D.C. Still others may retain the
status quo. Such a scenario would only further confuse the issue because
the standards adopted by the states would not be uniform. 13a
In an era of increasing multijurisdictional practice, a proliferation of
standards would produce serious problems. A law firm with offices in
several different states might face conflicting ethical obligations imposed
by different jurisdictions. 39 Clients may be confused as to how they
should obtain ancillary services. If this long battle over diversification
continues, as it probably will, the ABA's legitimacy as a voice for the
legal profession on ethical issues may be seriously eroded."4
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES
Beyond the question of whether the rules should be changed is the
more fundamental issue of whether they must be changed. An examina-
tion of case law involving the bar's regulatory powers demonstrates that
these rules cannot pass judicial muster. To understand this failure, it is
necessary to consider the interrelationship of a number of court decisions
involving lawyers in the areas of federal antitrust law and the First
Amendment.
136. These lawyers seem just as committed to continuing the fight as their opponents.
The losers in the August shootout, lead by the Real Property Section, introduced a reso-
lution to rescind the House action on ancillary business activities at the Association's
1992 midyear meeting in Dallas. In Dallas, the resolution was withdrawn with a promise
that it would be presented at the next annual meeting in San Francisco, in August, 1992.
137. See Randall Samborn & Victoria Slind-Flor, ABA '92: Feminism is Theme, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 24, 1992, at 1, 34.
138. In 1990, the ABA General Practice Section pushed through a rule that permits
the sale of a law practice. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.17. Because this rule
has not been added to state Rules of Professional Conduct, it has no authority and little
persuasive power. If anything, it adds confusion in regard to the application of the Model
Rules to actual practice.
139. In the case of the District of Columbia, passage of D.C. Rule 5.4(b), which per-
mits nonlawyer partners, raises interesting conflict of laws questions. Will a lawyer, who
is licensed in a state that does not allow nonlawyer partners, and practices as a partner in
a District of Columbia firm with a nonlawyer partner, be disciplined for violating state
Rule 5.4? Such a possibility is very real.
140. Although most jurisdictions have adopted the Model Rules, often subject to their
own variations, no mechanism exists for grafting amendments to the Model Rules on to
the state Rules. Thus, model rules such as Rule 1.17 may remain mere models unless
they are adopted by the individual states. This departure from a uniform standard under-
mines the overall persuasiveness of the Model Rules and erodes the development of a
national standard for ethical practice.
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A. Antitrust Considerations
The question of whether the rules restricting associations with
nonlawyers violate federal antitrust laws is not a simple one. The Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act prohibits business combinations that restrict free
trade, fix prices, or conspire to limit control of a business or industry to
certain members of society.' 41 The Act was originally intended to break
up monopolistic business organizations that had evolved during the latter
half of the nineteenth century. 42 Over the years, the Act has been uti-
lized as a weapon to prevent big business from squeezing out smaller
competitors. 43 Activities by any organization, group of organizations,
or individuals that promote monopolistic practices are subject to regula-
tion under the Act.'"
Conversely, the state has the power to restrict trade, grant monopolies
and authorize business combinations that would otherwise be illegal. In
Parker v. Brown, 45 the Supreme Court recognized a state action exemp-
tion to the coverage of the Sherman Act.", In Parker, farmers chal-
lenged a state regulatory program governing the production and
marketing of farm crops. 47 The Court held that the Sherman Act was
not intended to restrict state action in areas of legitimate state interest. 48
It should be noted that the Court has not refused the states the right to
grant certain monopolies, including the exclusive right to practice law, 49
teach,1 50 or grant degrees. 5' While there may be limits on a state's regu-
latory power, it is essential for an ordered society that the state have
power to make such regulatory decisions.' 52
This principle was tested in a case involving the legal profession, Gold-
141. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
142. See Thomas V. Vakerics, Antitrust Basics § 1.01 (Rel. 8 1992) ("The basic prem-
ise of the Sherman Act is that unrestrained competition will result in the most favorable
allocation of economic resources and the lowest prices possible for a variety of goods and
services."); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d
Cir. 1945) ("[A]mong the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to
great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them.").
143. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
144. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Aluminum
Co., 148 F.2d at 428-29.
145. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
146. See id. at 361.
147. See id. at 348-49.
148. See id. at 350-51.
149. See In re Pitchford, 581 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ark.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979);
Brown v. Wood, 516 S.W.2d 98, 99-100 (Ark. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
150. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Ex ret Charles, 504 N.E.2d
592, 600 (Mass. 1987); Minnesota v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 527-28 (Minn. 1985)
(citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)).
151. See Nova University v. Board of Governors, 287 S.E.2d 872, 882 (N.C. 1982).
152. The question of when the government should regulate or deregulate an industry,
although interesting and timely, is beyond the scope of this Article. It will be assumed
for purposes of this discussion that some intrusion into the affairs of the legal profession
implicates legitimate state interests.
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farb v. Virginia State Bar,"'s where two home buyers, who were them-
selves lawyers, sought to overturn the state bar's minimum fee schedule
after they discovered that every lawyer they contacted about settlement
on their new home quoted an identical price.154 At the time, most state
bars, including Virginia's, published minimum fee schedules. 15 Any
deviation from this schedule could subject a lawyer to discipline. The
rationale underlying these minimum fee schedules was the protection of
the public. It was argued that by maintaining price stability and prevent-
ing cut-rate practices, the bar could better provide professional services
to clients.' 56 In 1975, when Goldfarb was decided, there was a blanket
prohibition against advertising by lawyers as well.1 57 As a result, the
minimum fee schedule was frequently the only information available to
clients about the cost of legal services.' 58
In deciding Goldfarb, the Court recognized the hybrid nature of a bar
association. On the one hand, the bar can stand in the shoes of the sover-
eign, participating in such activities as licensure, discipline, and regula-
tion of lawyer conduct under grant of authority from the legislature and/
or the courts.'5 9 On the other hand, the bar can act like a trade associa-
tion, promoting the parochial interests of its members, lobbying for
favorable legislation, providing social activities, and affording individual
lawyers a representative organization through which they could voice
their opinions as a group)1 °
Goldfarb suggests that whenever the bar exceeds the scope of its sover-
eign capacity, it is merely a trade association, and as such, is not exempt
from the application of the Sherman Act.16 1 It cannot hide behind the
153. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
154. See id. at 775-78.
155. Before Goldfarb, over one-half of the state bar associations had promulgated min-
imum fee schedules. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal
Profession and Its Reform, 68 Tex L. Rev. 451, 467 n.123 (1989) (reviewing Richard L.
Abel, American Lawyers (1989)).
156. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 781. Under the prevailing paternalistic view of lawyer-
ing, clients were presumed to be so unsophisticated that they could not appreciate the
value of legal services, and in the absence of fee schedules could be victimized by unscru-
pulous lawyers.
157. See Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-101.
158. The author recalls taking a course in Professional Responsibility as a student in
1972, during which the professor brought to class a box of minimum fee schedules and
told his students that they should charge exactly what the schedules said in order to stay
out of trouble with the grievance committee. This instruction rendered the topic of legal
fees rather easy to master.
159. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. The Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb was a volun-
tary association. Even though its minimum fee schedule could be used as a basis for
disciplining lawyers under the state's Code of Professional Responsibility, the promulga-
tion of the fee schedule did not constitute state action under the Parker doctrine. See Id.
at 788-92. Apparently the critical distinction is between sovereign acts and non-sovereign
policies aimed at influencing lawyers' conduct, rather than the distinction between a vol-
untary or integrated bar.
160. See id. at 791-92.
161. See id.
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protection of the state action exemption to the Sherman Act merely be-
cause of its status as a bar association, nor can it transform an action of
the association into state action merely by labeling it as such.' 62
Two years after Goldfarb, the Court addressed the question of adver-
tising by lawyers in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.' 63 It was argued in
Bates that the same reasoning governing the Goldfarb decision should
apply to the ban on advertising, i.e., that the bar association was simply
acting as a trade association, and the ban on advertising constituted an
illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act."' The Court, however,
concluded that the power to regulate advertising was state action pro-
tected under Parker v. Brown.' 6  Because the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility was promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court and not the
bar association, as had been the case in Goldfarb, the ban on advertising
constituted an exercise of the state's sovereign power, and therefore was
excluded from the scope of the Sherman Act by the Parker doctrine.' 6
Limitations on the extent of the state's power to regulate advertising de-
rived instead from commercial speech principles under the First
Amendment. 1
67
Since the Bates decision, commentators have uncritically accepted the
notion that any challenge to a state's ethical rules based on the Sherman
Act must fail. 68 It may be time to review this assumption again.
Bates and Goldfarb present two different results distinguishable by the
fact that in Bates the challenged regulation was promulgated by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court, while in Goldfarb the minimum fee schedule was
established by a bar association. Under the Bates reasoning, it would
seem to follow that a minimum fee schedule adopted by the Supreme
Court would be exempt from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown.
Conversely, an ethical rule that is unilaterally adopted by a state bar as-
sociation which prohibits the advertising of legal services could be chal-
lenged on the grounds that it is anticompetitive.
The latter position is exactly the one in which doctors, dentists, and
162. See id.
163. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
164. See iL at 359.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 360. Although the Court in Goldfarb declined to rely on the constitu-
tional protection of the First Amendment as the basis for its decision, it accomplished the
same result under the Sherman Act. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
788-92 (1975). In Goldfarb, the bar association's minimum fee schedule was thrown out
in part because it deprived the Goldfarbs of their opportunity to select an attorney of
their choice. See id at 785. This is arguably a question of freedom of association impli-
cating First Amendment rights. Thus, both Goldfarb and Bates contain antitrust and
constitutional elements, although the Court decides the two cases under different
theories.
167. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 365; infra part III.B.2.
168. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 656. The Federal Trade Commission may have
reached the same conclusion when it decided not to proceed against lawyers as it has
against other professionals.
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
other professionals find themselves. In a series of cases, the courts have
struck down regulations relative to fees and external relationships. The
Federal Trade Commission has prosecuted these cases aggressively on
the ground that the practices are anticompetitive, and therefore violate
the Sherman Act. At the same time, the F.T.C. has declined to pursue
similar actions against lawyers primarily because of the limitations im-
posed by Parker v. Brown.
In American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission,'69 the Sec-
ond Circuit upheld a Federal Trade Commission order requiring the
A.M.A. to cease and desist from promulgating, implementing and en-
forcing restrictions on advertising and the solicitation of services by phy-
sicians. This determination also extended to contractual arrangements
between physicians and nonphysicians. 7 ° The A.M.A. case represented
the culmination of a protracted effort by the F.T.C. to change A.M.A.
policy.
While American Medical Ass'n v. F. T. C. dealt with the question of
whether the A.M.A. had acted in concert to effectuate restraints on
trade, Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n 171 concerned actual victims of
anticompetitive policies. Wilk involved a suit brought by chiropractors
against the American Medical Association charging that the "defendants
engaged in a conspiracy to eliminate the chiropractic profession by refus-
ing to deal with the plaintiffs and other chiropractors."'' 72 Principle 3 of
the A.M.A.'s Principles of Medical Ethics provided that "[a] physician
should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he
should not voluntarily professionally associate with anyone who violates
this principle."' 73 The plaintiffs contended that "the AMA used Princi-
ple 3 to achieve a boycott of chiropractors by first calling chiropractors
'unscientific practitioners,' and then advising AMA members and other
medical societies that it was unethical ... to associate with chiroprac-
tors."' 174  In rejecting the A.M.A. position, the court held "that the
AMA and its members engaged in a group boycott or conspiracy against
chiropractors"'' 75 in violation of the Sherman Act.
169. 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980). This case may be contrasted with United States v.
Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952) (government failed to prove that
the defendant physicians concertedly refused to deal with the private health associations).
170. See American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443, 447 (2d
Cir. 1980).
171. 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 895 F.2d 358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 927 (1990). This case was on remand from the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), which had reversed the
trial court's original decision in favor of the A.M.A.
172. Wilk, 671 F. Supp. at 1470.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1477. The A.M.A. argued that the considerable body of evidence intro-
duced by the plaintiffs was insufficient to establish that the group boycott was an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an impact on price
and output. See id. at 1479 (citing F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986); Philip Areeda, The Rule of Reason-A Catechism on Competition, 55 Antitrust
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The court in Wilk used a rule of reason analysis in finding that the
actions of the A.M.A. were unlawful.176 Under the rule of reason, the
court considers the effect upon competition produced by the restraint of
trade. Where the restraint is unreasonable in light of the effects pro-
duced, the restraint will be invalidated."' An analysis of the market
power of the group engaged in the restraint is frequently utilized by the
court in determining the reasonableness of the restraint."" Thus, in
Wilk, the court rejected the A.M.A.'s contention that evidence indicating
adverse effects, rather than a specific impact on price and output, was
insufficient to establish market power.
The treatment of group boycotts involving professional associations
was addressed in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists,79 cited in Wilk. In Indiana Federation of Dentists, dentists and
dental societies, objecting to health insurers' requests for x-rays for re-
view purposes, collectively agreed to withhold the x-rays from the insur-
ers. Justice White, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, stated:
A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to
customers, no less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price
term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market to advance
social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and services
.... Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue... such an
agreement limiting consumer choice... cannot be sustained under the
Rule of Reason.'
80
The court explained its application of the rule of reason rather than a
per se analysis:
Although this Court has in the past stated that group boycotts are
unlawful per se, we decline to resolve this case by forcing the Federa-
tion's policy into the "boycott" pigeonhole and invoking the per se
rule.... [Tihe category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not
to be expanded indiscriminately, and the per se approach has generally
been limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppli-
ers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with
a competitor-a situation obviously not present here. Moreover, we
have been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations
as unreasonable per se, see National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), and, in general, to extend per se
analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships
where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately ob-
L.J. 571 (1986)). A group boycott is an action by members of one group to refrain from
using the products or services of another group. Here, the court found that "[i]f there is
actual proof of adverse effects, then the plaintiffs need not prove market definition and
market power." Id at 1479.
176. See id at 1477. The other approach is a per se analysis, described infra, at note
181 and accompanying text.
177. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 68 (1977).
178. See id § 69.
179. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
180. Id at 459.
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vious. Thus, as did the FTC, we evaluate the restraint at issue in this
case under the Rule of Reason rather than a rule of per se illegality. 181
Thus, it appears that the rule of reason approach will generally be fol-
lowed where a professional association engages in a group boycott. 82
One recent case, Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass'n, 183 however, provides an exception to this trend. In a decision
that has been criticized,"' the Supreme Court applied a per se analysis to
find that the association's group boycott constituted an undue restraint of
trade.'85 Likewise, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,'86 the
Supreme Court held that the maximum-fee price fixing agreements of a
county medical society constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
While price fixing and other manifestly anticompetitive conduct may
trigger a per se analysis, Kreuzer v. American Academy of Peri-
odontology 187 illustrates the more typical judicial response to a group
boycott by a professional association. In Kreuzer, the defendant associa-
tion promulgated "limited practice requirements" that required members
to restrict their practice to periodontics.188 Because he refused to follow
these requirements, Dr. Kreuzer was excluded from membership in the
A.A.P. and denied access to patients.18 9 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit refused to apply a per se rule, and instead relied on the rule of rea-
son. The court noted that:
Group boycotts serve a variety of objectives. The classic group boycott
is a concerted attempt by a group of competitors at one level of compe-
tition to insulate themselves from competition from nongroup mem-
bers who seek to compete at that same level. Typically, the boycotting
group combines to deprive would-be competitors of a trade relation-
ship which they need in order to enter the level of competition at
which the group operates. 190
Recognizing that noneconomic motives, such as patient care, may con-
tribute to the challenged policy, the court held: "When the economic
self-interest of the boycotting group and its proffered justifications merge
181. Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted).
182. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1479 (N.D. I11. 1987),
aff'd, 895 F.2d 358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
183. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). In this case, lawyers who had regularly accepted court ap-
pointments in criminal cases refused their appointments until the District of Columbia
Council increased their compensation. This case also illustrates how quickly lawyer
groups will be charged under the Sherman Act when they are not cloaked in the protec-
tive mantle of the holding of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
184. See Diane E. Pierson, Casenote, Antitrust Analysis in Uncertain Times: FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 125, 153 (1990).
185. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
428-36 (1990).
186. 457 U.S. 332, 354-57 (1982).
187. 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
188. See id. at 1483.
189. See id. at 1493.
190. Id. (citation omitted).
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the rule of reason will seldom be satisfied. When, however, the justifica-
tion for the boycott is closely related to a lawful purpose the rule of rea-
son will generally be satisfied."'9 1 The court went on to say that "even if
evidence existed in the record to support the asserted justification... it
must be shown that the means chosen to achieve that end are the least
restrictive available.' 92
The medical antitrust cases do not stand alone. In cases involving
other occupations, the courts have found violations of the Sherman Act
in instances where professional rules prohibited business affiliations
outside the profession.' 9 The policies implicated in these cases are
analogous to those applicable when lawyers exclude nonlawyers from
certain practice arrangements. The rules prohibiting lawyers from enter-
ing into business ventures ancillary to the practice of law operate as a
group boycott excluding nonlawyers from competing at the same level of
competition as lawyers. There are arguably legitimate motives for the
rules-to enhance professionalism, protect clients and ensure ethical
practices. The rules are also economically motivated. It suffices to say
that the bar has sufficient market power to restrain competition. In the
absence of state action immunity, a challenge to these practices would
most likely result in a finding of a Sherman Act violation under a rule of
reason analysis.
The only case that has tackled this question using an antitrust analysis
is Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n.194 In Lawline, an organization of law-
yers and nonlawyers challenged ABA Model Code provisions enacted by
the Illinois Supreme Court that prohibited lawyers from forming part-
nerships with nonlawyers.' 95 The court applied the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine,' 96 under which private associations will not violate the antitrust
laws if they organize to persuade a governmental body to enact legisla-
tion that would produce a restraint of trade.' 97 In Lawline, the ABA
argued successfully that its attempts to persuade state supreme courts to
adopt its "model" code fell within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 98
The defendant state officials, courts and bar associations were held to be
191. Id at 1494.
192. Id at 1494-95.
193. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-
96 (1978); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 638 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
194. 738 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).
195. 738 F. Supp. at 291.
196. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Pres-
idents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
197. Although a group boycott may be protected under the First Amendment, purely
economic activities may result in violation of the Sherman Act. See Missouri v. National
Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
198. See Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, 738 F. Supp. 288, 292 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd,
956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).
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immune from antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown.1 99
In Hoover v. Ronwin 20 the Supreme Court took a closer look at the
immunity of bar officials under the Parker state action exemption. Hoo-
ver was an Arizona case concerning a state bar examiners' decision to
deny admission to a prospective attorney who failed the Arizona bar ex-
amination.201 The applicant alleged that the examiners had conspired to
restrain trade by artificially limiting the number of lawyers admitted to
practice in Arizona.20 2 The case reached the United States Supreme
Court after the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court order dismissing
the complaint.20 a Although the court of appeals ruled against the appli-
cant Ronwin, the Supreme Court said that the decision turned "on a
narrow and specific issue: who denied Ronwin admission to the Arizona
Bar?'"2°4 The answer to this question was that the Arizona Supreme
Court, not the bar examiners, made the decision not to admit Ronwin.20 5
The Court distinguished City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and
Light Co.,206 and Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder."7
Both Lafayette and Boulder involved actions by municipalities that os-
tensibly restrained trade. The city of Lafayette owned and operated an
electrical utility that competed with a privately owned utility.2 8 The
City of Boulder enacted an ordinance imposing a three month morato-
rium on the expansion of an existing cable television franchise where one
company was already operating in the area.2°
In each case, the Supreme Court held that the action of the municipal-
ity was subject to the antitrust laws. In Lafayette, the Court said that
Parker will only exempt municipalities' anticompetitive conduct if it con-
stitutes a state-sanctioned act that replaces competition with regulation
or monopoly public service.210 Significantly, the court noted: "Plainly
petitioners are in error in arguing that Parker held that all government
entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a State, are, simply by
199. See id. at 293. The court also summarily rejected constitutional claims raised by
the plaintiffs. See id. at 295-96.
200. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
201. See id. at 560.
202. See id. at 565.
203. See Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom.
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
204. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 581.
205. See id. at 578 ("Unlike the actions of the Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb, the
actions of the [examiners] are governed by the court's Rules. Those Rules carefully re-
serve to the court the authority to make the decision to admit or deny, and that decision
is the critical state action here."). But aren't they really the same? In Goldfarb, the rules
were promulgated by the bar association, but it was the Virginia Supreme Court that
administered discipline.
206. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
207. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
208. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 391-92.
209. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 45-46.
210. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413.
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reason of their status as such, exempt from the antitrust laws."2"1 Com-
paring Goldfarb and Bates, the Court emphasized that in Bates
[T]he state policy requiring the anticompetitive restraint as part of a
comprehensive regulatory system, was one clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed as state policy, and that the State's policy was
actively supervised by the State Supreme Court as the policymaker...
[W]hen the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompeti-
five practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated
power must obey the antitrust laws.212
In Boulder, the Court declared that the "clear articulation requirement"
was not met by the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitu-
tion that granted municipalities general rulemaking powers.213 Such a
provision, therefore, was insufficient to shield the city from antitrust
liability.214
Thus, the Supreme Court has established that not all actions of state
officials and subdivisions should be treated as acts of the sovereign.2 15 If
the actions in question are shown to be those of the sovereign, the Sher-
man Act will not apply. If, however, the actions do not represent clearly
articulated state policy and are not supervised by the state, 1 6 then the
Sherman Act will apply.
The question remains whether state ethical code prohibitions against
business affiliations between lawyers and nonlawyers constitute
state action in light of post-Bates cases such as Boulder and Lafay-
ette. Dictum in Lafayette suggests that they do.2 17 A close examina-
tion of Bates suggests that the rules against advertising were neither
adopted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition with regulation, 218 nor supervised by state supreme
211. Id. at 408.
212. Id, at 410, 416. Although Goldfarb may not stand for the proposition stated by
the Court, and Bates may not be a good example of "active supervision," it is noteworthy
that the Court used cases involving the legal profession to illustrate its point that not all
government acts are sovereign acts.
213. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 n.14
(1982).
214. See id. at 55 ("A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which mu-
nicipal liability is sought."). Boulder also reaffirmed the holding in Lafayette, which had
been a plurality decision.
215. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 103 (1980); Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1129-30
(E.D. La. 1985). The principle is analogous to the traditional notion in tort law that not
all government officials were protected with the same level of government immunity. See
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 131-132 (5th ed.
1984).
216. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
217. See id. at 416.
218. Nowhere in the Code or Rules (and comments thereto) is there any mention of a
state policy to eliminate competition. At most, such a policy may be inferred, but this is
not enough to violate the First Amendment given that a constitutional delegation of
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courts. 2 1 9 The majority in Hoover believed that the Arizona Supreme
Court's ratification of the bar examiners' decision concerning admission
of candidates was sufficient to meet the Lafayette standard.22 °
In a spirited dissent, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Blackmun and
White, in a 4-3 decision in which Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist did
not participate) likened present day occupational restrictions to medieval
guilds.221 Justice Stevens recognized the potential conflict produced by
government delegation of licensing power to private parties that have an
economic interest in limiting admissions. He further pointed out that the
state may avoid such a conflict by either formulating standards and ad-
ministering procedures or delegating the job to private parties, in which
case the policies displacing competition must be clearly and affirmatively
expressed and appropriately supervised.222 The test in Goldfarb and
Bates was whether the sovereign requires the restraint, and that test, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, was not met in Hoover.223
If Justice Stevens' analysis were applied to the ancillary business rules,
a question would arise as to whether these rules constitute a clearly ar-
ticulated and actively supervised delegation of power. Although at first
blush, these rules may be viewed as part of the same regulatory scheme
(the ethics code) as the regulations in Bates, one could argue that ethical
rules that impose a group boycott on nonlawyers should be afforded a
different treatment than ethical rules that are limited to restricting com-
petition among lawyers. Close scrutiny of post-Bates antitrust cases also
suggests that the rudimentary treatment of the Lafayette standard in
Bates224 does not square with the law as it has evolved.
Far from clearly articulating state policy to restrict competition, disci-
plinary codes neither reflect any intention to exclude nonlawyers from
dealing with lawyers in the delivery of client services, nor contain lan-
guage remotely suggesting authority to supervene the Sherman Act. To
the contrary, the Scope section of the Model Rules specifically states that
"nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal
duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a
duty." '225 Moreover, state supreme courts do not actively administer a
power was insufficient in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40, 52-56 (1982).
219. Although procedures vary from state to state, state supreme courts, in practice,
are seldom active participants in overseeing anticompetitive policy. Rather, they oversee
the disciplinary process as a whole. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (establishing standard through which
antitrust policies are "actively supervised by the state itself").
220. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 582 (1984).
221. See id. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 584-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 590 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Here, the sovereign is the State Supreme
Court, not petitioners, and the court did not require petitioners to grade the bar examina-
tion as they did.").
224. See Bates v. State Ba of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1977).
225. Model Rules, supra dote 7, Scope. Comparable language is contained in the
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policy of noncompetition. They may promulgate the rules, and they may
oversee the disciplinary system generally, but one is hard-pressed to
characterize such activity as active supervision of the state's policy of
noncompetition in accordance with Lafayette and Boulder."6 For these
reasons, the state action exemption should not apply to the rules restrict-
ing lawyers' ancillary business activities, and the rules should be treated
no differently than similar rules in other professions.
B. First Amendment Considerations
If it is concluded that a state supreme court's promulgation of an ethi-
cal code for lawyers falls within the scope of the Parker v. Brown exemp-
tion,227 a further question arises as to whether such action conflicts with
constitutionally guaranteed liberties. In the case of regulations that re-
strict innovative business ventures between lawyers and nonlawyers, the
First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution," presents fundamental
problems for any state regulation. Although this constitutional problem
has been alluded to in the recent ABA debates," 9 most commentators
have not explored the question fully.230
In order to understand the conflict between the right of lawyers to
engage in various forms of business with nonlawyers and the state's
power to regulate lawyers' expressive conduct involving such activities, it
is necessary to look at the basic objectives of the First Amendment, and
the legal doctrines that apply to lawyers that engage in commercial activ-
ity through professional associations. It is further necessary to both eval-
uate the nature of such activity and apply an appropriate test for
determining whether the rules are unnecessarily broad.
Two possible approaches may be used to challenge ethical rules that
restrict relationships between lawyers and nonlawyers: freedom of asso-
ciation and commercial speech. While each carries with it specific im-
Model Code. Although this admonition is cited most often in the context of legal mal-
practice, it may also be read to repudiate the establishment through the Rules of a state-
sanctioned anticompetitive policy.
226. That state supreme court justices are themselves lawyers should render them sus-
pect for purposes of either articulating or administering an anticompetitive policy in the
first place. To acknowledge such authority condones the foxes guarding the henhouse.
227. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
228. U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 11-2, at 772 (2d ed. 1988) ("[Mlany of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
Amendments' have been selectively absorbed into the fourteenth.") (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)).
229. See American Bar Association Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional
Responsibility: Report To The House of Delegates 13 (1991) (summarizing Ethics Com-
mittee's study of lawyers' ancillary business activities); Stanley, supra note 22, at 31-32.
230. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 652-55. Although Professor Andres%' analysis
represents the most thorough review of the First Amendment attack on the business reg-
ulations, his conclusion that such a challenge will fail needs reexamination. See infra this
Part.
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pediments to a successful attack on the rules, both approaches provide
viable alternatives to the antitrust theory and should be explored.
The freedom of association approach argues that lawyers have a con-
stitutional right to associate with others for the delivery of legal services,
and that restrictions on associations with nonlawyers infringe on that
right. Such restrictions may be viewed as falling within either of two
paradigms.23 Under the first line of analysis, the restrictions would be
analogized to cases in which the government has either sought to outlaw
an association outright or punish an individual's affiliation with it.232 Es-
tablished principles of first amendment jurisprudence233 would warrant
that a lawyer's affiliation with a nonlawyer could not be prohibited out-
right unless it could be shown that the resulting association "actively
engaged in lawless conduct"2 34 or threatened to incite imminent lawless
action. 235 Moreover, a lawyer who affiliated with a nonlawyer could not
be punished for such affiliation unless a prohibition of the resulting asso-
ciation were constitutionally permissible,2 36 and it were shown that the
lawyer engaged in the affiliation "with knowledge of its illegality, and...
with the specific intent of furthering [the association's] illegal aims by
such affiliation. 2 37
Under the second line of analysis, restrictions on lawyer affiliations
with nonlawyers would be analogized to cases in which the "government
makes no attempt to brand an association, or affiliation with it, as unlaw-
ful, but nonetheless interferes significantly... with an activity integral to
the association... as in the case of... attempts to prevent labor unions
from referring their members to union attorneys for assistance in litiga-
tion."'2 38 Under this line of analysis:
Such governmental interference also violates the first and fourteenth
amendments even if it is justified by a legitimate objective, such as the
avoidance of conflicts of interest in attorney-client relationships, unless
[the] government shows that a serious impairment of the objective
would clearly occur in the absence of the challenged interference, and
that no less intrusive regulation could prevent such impairment.2 39
The other approach to the problem is to re-examine Bates and its prog-
231. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-26, at 1015-17. The second paradigm, see infra
notes 238-39 and accompanying text, appears to be more applicable to nonlawyer affilia-
tions than the first. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. The second paradigm
is discussed in detail, see infra Part III.B. 1.
232. See id. § 12-26, at 1015.
233. See id. § 12-9, at 841-49.
234. Id. § 12-26, at 1015.
235. See id. (citing Noto v. United States. 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
236. See id.; supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
237. Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-26, at 1015 (citing Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966)).
238. Id. § 12-26, at 1016 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va.
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)).
239. Id. § 12-26, at 1016-17 (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223-25 (1967)).
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eny with respect to the limits of state regulation of protected First
Amendment rights. If affiliations between lawyers and nonlawyers can
be construed to fit into the same class of protected expression as the com-
mercial speech in Bates, then the same test for determining the adequacy
of the rules should be applied. Under this test, prophylactic prohibitions
would give way to less restrictive measures.
In addition to the freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly and
petition that are enumerated in the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion,2" the Supreme Court has read the First Amendment to imply the
rights of expression,241 privacy,242 and association.243 Together, these
rights create a powerful bulwark for the protection of individual lib-
erty.2' Nevertheless, these rights are not absolute, and the government
may abridge them in specific circumstances.245
Lawyers confront a unique set of First Amendment problems in their
professional capacity. As citizens they retain the same rights as other
citizens to speak out on issues of public concern.2" They are afforded
the same constitutional protection as nonlawyers in the conduct of their
private lives. At the same time, some aspects of lawyering necessitate
restriction of the unfettered freedom of expression. Lawyers, as officers
of the court, are subject to greater restrictions in the exercise of First
Amendment rights than nonlawyers.247 On pain of discipline, an attor-
ney may not reveal the confidences of her client,248 make prejudicial ex-
trajudicial comments about a case in litigation,24 9 or disrupt the court."
At the same time, a citizen does not sacrifice all her First Amendment
rights by becoming a lawyer. Accordingly, rules that prohibit affiliations
between lawyers and nonlawyers must be addressed in light of this con-
240. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.").
241. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-1, at 785-89.
242. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
243. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-26, at 1010-22.
244. See id. § 12-1, at 785-89.
245. See, eg., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (upholding denial of access to
military base for use as a public forum); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)
(privilege of using streets and parks for communication of views may be regulated in the
public interest).
246. See U.S. Const. amend. I.
247. Ethical Rules may prevent a lawyer from making statements to the press regard-
ing pending cases. These rules do not violate the lawyer's First Amendment rights be-
cause such rules implicate important state interests relating to the control over the
professional conduct of its attorneys. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434-35 (1982).
248. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.6(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 4-
101(B).
249. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 3.6(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 7-
107.
250. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 3.5(c); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 7-
106(C).
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cern over the extent to which the government may properly restrict the
First Amendment rights of lawyers in the conduct of their practices.
1. Freedom of Association
Among the rights implied in the First Amendment is the freedom of
association.251 Paradoxically, the freedom of association is so basic that
the situations in which it has been raised as an independent legal issue
have been limited. Some commentators have suggested that associational
interests have been raised in other cases under different names.25 2 For
example, the school desegregation cases may be viewed as freedom of
association cases.253 When lawyers enter into business relationships with
nonlawyers, rules that prohibit such arrangements are clearly infringe-
ments on the right of association. Yet, if the state has a legitimate inter-
est in prohibiting certain associations, the state interest must be balanced
against the associational rights. The issue of a lawyers' freedom of asso-
ciation has been raised in a number of cases. An examination of these
cases will help interpret the doctrine of freedom of association as it ap-
plies to law firm diversification.
In a 1963 case, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar,254 the Supreme Court struck down a prohibition
against a group legal services plan created by a union for the benefit of its
members.255 Under the plan, union members could obtain specified legal
services from lawyers on a panel selected by the union.256 The state
claimed that the arrangement violated ethical rules that prohibited a law-
yer from allowing a nonlawyer to direct the lawyer's independent profes-
sional judgment.2" 7 In invalidating the prohibition, the Court relied
upon NAACP v. Button.25 In Button, the Court had enjoined the en-
forcement of ethical rules that prohibited NAACP attorneys from solicit-
ing legal business for the purpose of identifying victims of racial
discrimination. 259 The principle that began with Button, namely, that
lawyers could solicit clients in the exercise of their First Amendment
rights, was eventually upheld in In re Primus.2 " Trainmen, Button, and
251. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-26, at 1010-22.
252. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
Yale L.J. 1, 3 (1964).
253. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 559 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1977).
254. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
255. See id. at 8.
256. See id. at 4.
257. See id. at 6 n.10 (citing the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association, canon 35 (1938)).
258. See id. at 6, 8 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 444 (1963)).
259. See Button, 371 U.S. at 419, 444.
260. 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978).
"Free trade in ideas" means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action,
not merely to describe facts. The First and Fourteenth Amendments require a
measure of protection for "advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights,"
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Primus thus stand for the proposition that the protection of the First
Amendment is not limited to the narrow concept of spoken and written
words.
In another line of cases, the Court has dealt with the denial of bar
applications on the basis of character and fitness. In many of these cases
the disqualified candidates were involved in politically unpopular organi-
zations.26 1 In Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,262 an applicant was denied
admission to the Arizona bar after having passed the written exam be-
cause she refused to answer a question on the bar application that asked
if she had ever been a member of an organization that advocated the
violent overthrow of the government.263 Baird argued that the question
required her to surmise the objectives of every organization to which she
had belonged in the past,2 " and would infringe upon her freedom to
associate with organizations of her choice.265 In finding for Baird, the
Court held that Baird's First Amendment associational interest was par-
amount to the bar's power to review the character and fitness of
applicants.
In Hishon v. King & Spalding,26 6 the Court upheld the complaint of a
woman who was denied partnership in a prominent Atlanta law firm be-
cause of her sex.267 Despite the fact that Hishon had been given excellent
evaluations and reviews while working as an associate at the firm, she
was passed over for partnership. The firm argued that the essence of a
partnership is that partners are permitted to choose whomever they want
as fellow partners, unfettered by Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights
Act.268 Significantly, the Court did not address the right of partners to
associate freely through partnership election. Rather, the Court instead
held that Hishon would be permitted to establish on remand that when
she was recruited and hired by the firm, she was promised an equal op-
portunity to be considered for partnership, and that such promise was a
part of the employment contract protected by Title VII 269
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell pointed out that it would not
be a violation of Title VII for any number of lawyers to discriminate in
including "advis[ing] another that his legal rights have been infringed" and re-
fer[ring] him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys... for assistance.
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
261. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154, 176 (1971); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 234-35 (1957).
262. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
263. See id at 4-5.
264. See id at 7.
265. See ia at 8. Forcing an individual to make such an inquiry could have a chilling
effect on the right of individuals to choose their associations if they ever hoped to practice
law. Significantly, the question did not ask whether she personally advocated the violent
overthrow of the government. See iL at 4-5.
266. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
267. See id at 74, 78.
268. See id at 78.
269. See id at 76.
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the formation of a partnership or in the addition of a lateral partner.270
On the other hand, he suggested that a law firm's discrimination in the
selection of partners from outside the firm may not be constitutionally
protected either.271
All of these cases suggest that lawyers possess basic First Amendment
rights to join and form associations and express their views freely. Free-
dom of association in many ways depends upon some other right to give
it substance. For example, in civil rights cases such as Button, the right
of association was subordinate to the right of free speech asserted by
members of the association.272 Thus, an association may do the same
things as an individual under the rubric of freedom of expression. This
ability includes the right to associate with others in the exercise of these
expressive rights.273
In the landmark case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,274 the Supreme
Court struck down, on the basis of commercial speech, a state regulation
that banned the advertisement of legal services. 275 The defendants in this
case, Bates and O'Steen, were individual lawyers who acted through an
association, which they called the "Legal Clinic of Bates and
O'Steen. ' '276 Disciplinary action was taken against the defendants be-
cause their association advertised legal services in contravention of Ari-
zona DR 2-101.277
Ethical rules against advertising and solicitation appear to apply with
equal force to both associations of lawyers and individual practition-
ers.27' Thus, under the First Amendment, the law firm, as an association
of lawyers, appears to have the same rights as an individual lawyer that
practices alone.
The act of associating with a particular group may contain elements of
270. See id. at 79.
271. "[I]nvidious private discrimination... has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections." This is not to say, however, that enforcement of
laws that ban discrimination will always be without cost to other values, includ-
ing constitutional rights. Such laws may impede the exercise of personal judg-
ment in choosing one's associates or colleagues. Impediments to the exercise of
one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 80 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
272. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
273. See Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
274. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
275. See id. at 384.
276. Id. at 385; see id. at 354.
277. See id. at 355-56.
278. Although the Supreme Court has protected the freedom of attorneys to associate
for purposes of assembly, speech and other forms of free expression, it is not clear that the
limits of associational freedom are coextensive with the limits of these other constitu-
tional rights. Are there any activities engaged in by an association that would not merit
the constitutional protection that would otherwise be afforded to an individual? Does the
right to associate imply the freedom to do anything in the name of the association?
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both expression and action. 9 The motivation for the association may be
political or religious expression, business or economic enterprise, or
something in between. When fundamental First Amendment rights are
implicated, a strict scrutiny standard has been applied to state regulatory
schemes.280 On the other hand, when purely commercial activity is in-
volved, a less restrictive rational basis test has been employed. 281 In
cases that do not fit neatly into either extreme, an intermediate level of
scrutiny is appropriate.28 2 In short, the Court employs a calculus under
which there is a direct relationship between the First Amendment con-
cerns and the burden the state carries in defending its regulations.
In one sense, the question is simply: what type of scrutiny is required
when state regulations prohibit lawyers from associating with nonlawy-
ers for the purpose of providing ancillary business services to clients?
Initially, such arrangements appear to be commercial activity, necessitat-
ing that the state only have to show a rational basis for the prohibition.
Upon reflection, however, it seems that the associational activity in-
volved in these lawyer-nonlawyer enterprises contains a substantial ele-
ment of expression.28 3 Accordingly, a question arises as to whether this
expressive element changes the level of scrutiny.
The Rules of Professional Conduct represent more than a state's com-
mercial regulation of an industry. Rather, they have been promulgated
by lawyers as an expression of the legal profession's duties in light of
professional values. The Rules contain certain self-serving provisions,
but on the whole they represent a credo, a philosophy, and, moreover, an
expression of what it means to be a lawyer.2s4 In most states, this docu-
ment is given force through its adoption by the state's highest court. In
this sense, the Rules of Professional Conduct become a regulatory
formulation.285
What happens when lawyers hold a different view of the profession
279. See Tribe, supra note 228, § 12-26, at 1011-12 (citing Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)).
280. See United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971) ("[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.").
281. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
282. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977). An intermediate scrutiny has
also been applied in commercial speech cases involving legal advertising. See Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) ("There is no longer any room to
doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that af-
forded 'noncommercial speech.' "). The very question that left no doubt in the mind of
Justice White, troubles Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices O'Connor and Scalia.
This raises the specter of abandonment of the commercial speech doctrine, or at least a
reduced scrutiny as the makeup of the Supreme Court changes. See id. at 676
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
283. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
284. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Preamble and Preliminary Statement.
285. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. Rev. 281, 284-85 (1979).
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than the one proffered in official dogma? What if a lawyer or group of
lawyers disagree with the party line? In Bates, the challenged law on
advertising was clear and unequivocal.286 Yet, the Legal Clinic of Bates
and O'Steen maintained a different philosophy for the practice of law,
which could not be pursued under existing rules.287 Bates and O'Steen
did not set out to break the disciplinary rules of the profession, but
merely tried to provide routine legal services to people of moderate
means. They also discovered that they could not sustain their practice
without advertising.288 Even though economic considerations were in-
volved in Bates, the seminal issue involved the free expression of an idea
about the nature of the practice of law that could not be given force
without violating the disciplinary rule.289 The same expressive value ap-
pears in the ABA debate, in the statements of the ancillary business
proponents.2 °
At least one case has addressed the level of scrutiny applicable to the
regulation of professional practice. In Garcia v. Texas State Board of
Medical Examiners,291 the court stated the long recognized rule that it is
within "[t]he police power of the State ... to enact comprehensive, de-
tailed, and rigid regulations for the practice of medicine, surgery, and
dentistry. ' 292 It has been unchallenged that it is within the power of the
state to regulate both legal and health services. According to Garcia, the
state must balance the needs of the general public for qualified profes-
sionals against the state's police power to regulate. Constitutional rights
may be abridged in the process. The need to protect the public from
unlicensed doctors is so great, that in order to outweigh this need, it must
be clearly demonstrated that the state's exercise of power is unreasona-
ble.293 Thus, the court found a rational basis for preventing a nonphysi-
cian from running a medical corporation: it would prevent abuses
resulting from lay-person control and preserve the doctor-patient
relationship.294
The dangers of lay control of a medical corporation are arguably
stronger than the risks inherent when a nonlawyer associates with a law-
yer. This is primarily due to fact that lawyers will retain control over
286. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977).
287. See id. at 354.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 383-84.
290. See Jones, supra note 21, at 684-85, 688. In fact, the political nature of the debate,
the forum in which the ideas are being discussed, and the process by which compromise
has been achieved lead inexorably to the conclusion that this is the very type of robust
debate on issues of public concern that the First Amendment seeks to foster. If, as earlier
suggested in this Article, the proponents and opponents represent different visions for the
future of the legal profession and the delivery of legal services, the First Amendment
component of lawyer-nonlawyer ventures is very high.
291. 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 421 U.S. 995 (1975).
292. See Garcia, 384 F. Supp. at 437.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 440.
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legal services.29 It may also be argued that there is less of an expressive
element in the prohibition found in Garcia than in lawyer-nonlawyer
ventures. Underlying this argument is the fact that the medical services
provided through the corporation in Garcia did not differ from those pro-
vided by a doctor-operated enterprise; the only difference between the
two enterprises related to the control of the corporation. It may be fur-
ther argued that the state's interest in protecting human life is greater
than its interest in protecting individuals' economic and legal interests.
Consequently, a strong case can be made that the holding in Garcia
should not be applied to the legal profession.
In In re 1115 Legal Service Care,296 the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered whether a non-commercial, internally staffed, prepaid legal
service plan violated ethical rules because nonlawyers acted as trust-
ees.2 97 Under New Jersey rules, practicing law within this type of organi-
zational structure was not permitted on the theory that when nonlawyers
are in control of a legal corporation, they might be in a position to direct
the rendition of legal services, and place their own interests ahead of
those of the clients. The court found an exception to this rule, which is
applicable provided that clients' interests predominate and nonlawyer
trustees are kept from exercising professional judgment and involvement
in individual cases.
If groups of persons combine for valid economic, social, or other rea-
sons not inconsistent with public policy and seek in conjunction with
their mutual interests to provide legal services to their constituency, we
see no supervening interest bearing on the regulation of the legal pro-
fession that should militate against such efforts.29 8
Thus, the court found that this type of legal service plan served an im-
portant and useful function by providing needed services, and held that
the rules should be revised to allow such organizations to engage in the
practice of law.299
Other cases have reached a similar result.3" In NAACP v. Button,3°'
the Court considered whether a regulation that restricts lawyer referrals
and recommendations unduly limits protected freedom of association.'
295. The facts in Garcia indicate that the board of directors of the medical corporation
contained no doctors at all. See id at 436.
296. 541 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1988).
297. See id.
298. Id at 676.
299. See id at 677.
300. See eg., In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1059 (NJ. 1981) (pro-
viding an exception to treatment as the unauthorized practice of law where the corpora-
tion operates for charitable and benevolent purposes). But see Florida Bar v.
Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So.2d 797, 798-99 (Fla. 1980) (denying
exception to treatment as the unauthorized practice of law); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n
v. Gold Shield, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1236-37 (Ohio 1975) (no exception to treatment as
unauthorized practice of law).
301. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
302. See id
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Although the state claimed that this situation fell within the traditional
purview of state regulation of professional conduct, the Court held that
only a compelling state interest in regulating particular conduct could
justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.30 3 The Court further held
that in order to justify broad prohibitions, the state must establish a sub-
stantial regulatory interest by proving that the feared evils will result if
the conduct is allowed.3° It is not sufficient to infer that there will be
injurious intervention in, or control of, litigation without specific allega-
tions and proof on the record.30 5 Since the NAACP shared the same
aims and interests as its members and clients, there was little risk of
harm. 6 The regulation infringed on the right of the NAACP, its mem-
bers and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who
seek legal redress for infringements of constitutionally protected
rights.30 7  Although Button involved the exercise of protected First
Amendment rights by citizens who were represented by lawyers, at the
heart of the case was the mechanism for the delivery of legal services. If
NAACP attorneys could not reach out to potential victims of discrimina-
tion, the type of class action litigation contemplated by the legal staff
would be much more difficult to pursue. It follows that Button stands for
the proposition that lawyers have a right of association for the purpose of
forming and utilizing legal service delivery systems to meet the needs of
potential clients.
The same idea resurfaced in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,308 in which the Supreme Court upheld a
labor union's right to operate a group legal services plan. 3 ' 9 Trainmen
relied on the holding in Button, although the union and its members were
not seeking redress of constitutional grievances. In both cases, an inno-
vative service delivery system was upheld despite the arrangement's vio-
lation of ethical rules. In fact, Trainmen deals specifically with a practice
delivery system involving both lawyers and nonlawyers. 310
Although there are associational interests at issue in these cases, their
pure First Amendment aspects make it hard to generalize in applying
their holdings to the commercial setting. The problem of commercial
303. See id. at 438.
304. See id. at 444.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 443.
307. See id. at 433 ("Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to sur-
vive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.").
308. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
309. See id. at 8.
310. The bar's response was to graft a group legal services exception to the ethical
rules. See Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-103(D)(4). The rambling regulation was
eliminated as unnecessary by the framers of the Model Rules. Ironically, almost all the
charges that have been levied at ancillary business activities by law firms can be, and have
been, directed at group legal services. Furthermore, after almost three decades of legiti-
macy, there is no evidence that unprofessional conduct is any more prevalent in group
legal services plans than in law firms engaging in private practice.
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association is not a new one. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,311 the
Supreme Court held that male members' freedoms of intimate or expres-
sive association were not abridged through the application of a Minne-
sota human rights act that required the admittance of women
members.312 For purposes of First Amendment analysis, the Court dis-
tinguished the idea of freedom of intimate association in one's personal
and family relationships, from the idea of expressive association.313 With
respect to expressive association, the Court stated:
[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associ-
ate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends....
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, abso-
lute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppres-
sion of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms. 314
The Court then held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against female citizens justified the infringement of male
members' associational freedoms.315
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in IDK, Inc v. County of Clark,316 held
that the operators of an escort service could not claim the protection of
expressive association because escort services were primarily commercial
rather than communicative.3" 7 Other cases have recognized that
although an activity may be commercial in nature, it is not automatically
excluded from First Amendment protection.a 8 Thus, both corporate
speech and association merit protection if First Amendment values are
implicated. Commercial activity, however, would not be protected if
First Amendment values are not implicated. In the context of legal serv-
ices, this means that law firms and other legal services providers deserve
the same consideration for their expressive conduct that individuals re-
ceive. The issue thus becomes one of delineation between activities that
are expressive and those that are commercial.
311. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
312. See id at 623.
313. See id. at 619-20.
314. Id. at 622-23.
315. See id. at 623.
316. 836 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988).
317. See id. at 1194-95 (despite the obvious "communication" in dating, an otherwise
commercial enterprise cannot secure constitutional protection simply by calling an activ-
ity "expressive").
318. See, eg., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1986) (holding that utility was not required to allow consumer group to use space in its
newsletter); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) (criminal
statute that prohibited banks and other corporations from making expenditures to influ-
ence voting represented an unconstitutional abridgement of corporate free speech).
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In In re National Store Fixture Co. 319 the court examined a regulation
that prohibited the appointment of persons associated with a relative of a
bankruptcy judge to the position of trustee in the same court where that
judge sits. 2 ° The court, employing a rational basis test, balanced the
legitimate government interests promoted by the regulation against the
personal rights being threatened. 321 Noting that the rule created an ir-
rebuttable presumption that the appointment of trustees associated with
a relative of a bankruptcy judge would cause both judges and lawyers to
lose their integrity, the court stated that such presumptions are not ap-
propriate when more precise tests are available. The regulation violated
the constitutional right of association because it created an irrebuttable
presumption although safeguards already existed.322 Attorneys may
move to disqualify a judge if fairness becomes an issue, 2 a but there is no
need to prohibit the appointment of a trustee simply because of the
trustee's associations.
National Store demonstrates that regulations infringing on the freedom
of association may fail the scrutiny of the rational basis test. Button and
Trainmen recognize that associational interests may reach a higher level
implicating the strict scrutiny test. Under either test, the state is not free
to impose prohibitions on lawyers' associations without valid reason, and
any regulatory scheme is subject to review under the appropriate test.324
In the search to identify some guiding principles, it might make sense
to allow associations between lawyers and nonlawyers, while enforcing
existing disciplinary rules that address specific evils. Additional rules
could be promulgated as they become necessary. Courts have generally
not upheld regulations that make an irrebuttable presumption that evils
may result. 325 Associations between lawyers and nonlawyers have been
banned because of fears that the nonlawyer may control litigation,3 26 vio-
late the attorney-client privilege,327 or undermine professional stan-
dards.328 These evils, if they occur, certainly would be injurious to the
public. Because the courts, in other contexts, have required proof that
evils will inevitably occur,329 there should be no absolute ban on associa-
319. 37 B.R. 481 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
320. See id.
321. See id. at 487.
322. See id. at 488-89.
323. See id. at 487.
324. In other cases, the courts have been unwilling to strike down requirements im-
posed upon bar applicants. See, e.g., Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988)
(upholding mandatory bar membership), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989), rev'g Levine v.
Supreme Court of Wis., 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Nordgren v. Hafter, 616 F.
Supp. 742 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (upholding requirement of graduation from an ABA-ap-
proved law school), aff'd, 789 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
325. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (invalidating disci-
plinary rule that prohibited advertisements by lawyers).
326. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 605.
327. See id. at 614.
328. See id. at 628-29; supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
329. See In re National Store Fixture Co., 37 B.R. 481, 489 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984)
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tions with nonlawyers. Prophylactic rules create an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of harm. Other ethical rules provide a more precise means of
counteracting these evils in the context of lawyers' actions.330 The ethi-
cal rules should be understood to govern lawyers' conduct in their as-
sociations with nonlawyers.331 If a lawyer puts profit ahead of
representation, or otherwise fails to represent a client competently, disci-
plinary actions may be brought against the attorney. Enforcement of ex-
isting rules should be adequate to permit associations with nonlawyers
while still protecting the client.332
Because of its commercial nature, the typical law practice may not
deserve the same degree of constitutional protection that the Court af-
forded the practice arrangements in Button and Trainmen. Nevertheless,
law firm diversification represents more than ordinary business activity.
There are political ramifications to the ancillary business debate that go
directly to the questions of what it means to be a competent lawyer, how
clients should be represented, and what systems can best provide legal
services. 3  In a larger sense, all legal representation involves some form
of defense or vindication of the rights of clients, a role that has been
recognized as a fundamental right in the criminal context.3 1 Accord-
ingly, all restrictions on lawyers' ability to form associations to provide
legal services have a direct impact on client rights. For these reasons, it
is appropriate to hold the state to a higher standard of scrutiny than the
rational basis test.335
(voiding Bankruptcy Rule 5002 which absolutely barred appointment of persons associ-
ated with the relative of a judge of the bankruptcy court as bankruptcy trustees before
that court).
330. The idea that ethical violations are more likely to occur when lawyers are in-
volved in nonlegal businesses or associate in practice with nonlawyers is highly specula-
tive. The record of group legal services programs strongly suggests that there is no basis
for an absolute ban on such associations. In-house corporate counsel also work under the
direction of norlawyers, but there is no record of charges that the existence of corporate
law departments undermines professionalism. Lawyers can be disciplined for misconduct
whether or not they are practicing law, so the ethical rules themselves provide a strong
incentive for self regulation by lawyers of their ancillary business activities.
331. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Preamble, Rule 5.
332. In fact, lawyers could have access to information in other fields, such as account-
ing, economics, or science, in the most economically feasible and efficient way. The pres-
ent system, under which such associations are prohibited, forces lawyers to purchase the
expertise of consultants on the open market, at premium rates. This drives up the cost of
legal services and reduces the competitiveness of lawyers in the marketplace.
333. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
334. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963).
335. "The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well in-
clude, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the
restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be in-
fringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully
protect."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 562 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
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If expressive associations are to be regulated in the same way as
speech, then commercial/expressive associations deserve the same level
of scrutiny as commercial speech. Thus, the proper test should be that
the right of lawyers to associate with nonlawyers in the delivery of serv-
ices may only be regulated if: (1) the state can demonstrate that it has a
substantial interest to be protected by imposing the regulation; (2) the
regulation furthers the substantial state interest; and (3) the regulation is
drawn no more broadly than necessary in order to carry out the state
interest in question.336 Such a test would recognize that lawyers do not
have unfettered power to do whatever they want in the name of the First
Amendment. At the same time, it would acknowledge that the state does
not have unfettered authority to regulate associational interests.
In the context of this Article, state regulation appears in the form of a
professional disciplinary code.337 Regulations that govern lawyers' pro-
fessional associations deserve special scrutiny. These regulations place a
number of significant restrictions on the right of lawyers to freely associ-
ate with nonlawyers. For example, a lawyer may not enter into a part-
nership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities constitutes the practice
of law.338 In addition, a lawyer may not split a fee with a nonlawyer,
3 3 9
or accept employment in a case if his or her independent professional
judgment may be directed by a nonlawyer.34 Moreover, a lawyer may
not assist a nonlawyer to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. 34'
In looking at these rules, it is necessary to identify the substantial state
interest involved. If there is a substantial state interest, do the rules fur-
ther that interest, and are they sufficiently narrow? A rule may in fact
prohibit conduct in furtherance of the state interest, but if it also prohib-
its conduct that does not implicate the state interest, the rule may be held
unconstitutional.
The history of the organized bar's involvement in the area of legal ad-
vertising suggests the need to look carefully at the regulatory scheme
governing business ventures with nonlawyers. The bar's approach to the
question of advertising was to adopt a prophylactic rule prohibiting all
336. This proposed test parallels the Central Hudson Gas test. See infra note 374 and
accompanying text. This test was first articulated in the context of legal services in In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
337. Both the Model Code and the Model Rules govern lawyers' conduct in a wide
variety of situations: dealings with clients, other lawyers, the courts, each other, and the
outside world. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Preamble; Model Code, supra note 30,
Preamble.
338. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
103.
339. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(a); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
102.
340. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.4(c); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 5-
107(B).
341. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 5.5(b); Model Code, supra note 30, DR 3-
101(A).
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advertising.3 42 After Bates, many states adopted extensive "laundry list"
regulations prohibiting all manner of conduct involving communications
with potential clients.34 In In re R.M.J,3  the Supreme Court sent a
message that such comprehensive regulations were impermissible.~"
Thereafter, the various state codes of professional responsibility and the
new Model Rules of Professional Conduct attempted to focus on the fun-
damental state interest in preventing false, deceptive and misleading
communications about legal services. 34 These new rules, nevertheless,
continued to prohibit broad classes of communication without consider-
ing the effect of these communications on the state interest." 7 Thus, in
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 48 the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional that state's rule prohibiting the use of targeted direct mail promo-
tions.349 Moreover, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Committee of Illinois,350 the Court overturned a rule that prohibited the
advertising of a legal specialization.3a ' Throughout the advertising
drama, bar associations consistently drafted regulations as broadly as
possible, and failed to recognize the Supreme Court's clear message that
imposed limits on their own regulatory power.352
The present rules establish a blanket prohibition against associations
with nonlawyers without examining the state's interest in proscribing the
conduct. Moreover, these rules do not consider whether such interest is
furthered, and ignore whether they sweep unnecessarily broad. An ex-
amination of the rules in question indicates that in this area, as in adver-
tising, the bar has failed to meet the constitutional test.353 Even if the
state can show that it has legitimate interests, it is not at all clear that the
342. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) ('[The disciplinary rule
[prohibiting advertising] serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to
keep the public in ignorance.").
343. See Model Code, supra note 30, DR 2-101(A).
344. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
345. See id at 207. The Court stated that "although the States may regulate commer-
cial speech, the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that they do so with care and
in a manner no more extensive than reasonably necessary to further substantial inter-
ests." Id
346. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rules 7.1, 7.2.
347. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3. The rule currently prohibits in-person
solicitation and all telephonic contact with prospective clients. At one time it also pro-
hibited direct-mail advertising. See id cmt. at 324.
348. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
349. See id at 476-78.
350. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
351. See id at 107.
352. This "misunderstanding" of the Court's meaning in the advertising saga is impor-
tant to this discussion in two ways: first, it shows that the organized bar is not necessarily
right when it interprets how lawyers ought to practice law; secondly, it shows that the
Supreme Court has been willing to look behind the veneer of professionalism to strike
down ethical rules that infringe protected constitutional rights.
353. Professor Andrews persuasively demonstrates that the only meaningful justifica-
tion for the "business canons" is economic protectionism. See Andrews, supra note 13, at
621-22. He sounds uncannily reminiscent of the Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), as well as in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,
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rules against affiliations with nonlawyers further those interests. Cer-
tainly, a less restrictive means than a blanket prohibition could be de-
vised to further the state interest. Even if the less stringent rational basis
test were used, economic protectionism would not be a sufficient reason
to prohibit associations protected under the First Amendment."5 4 Thus,
despite courts' reticence to strike down regulations in a number of com-
mercial association cases, there are persuasive arguments for doing so in
the case of ancillary businesses.
2. Commercial Speech
The commercial speech approach to challenging lawyer-nonlawyer af-
filiations involves a re-examination of Supreme Court cases concerning
the advertising of legal services. The Court has consistently permitted
regulation of false, deceptive and misleading communications to prospec-
tive clients concerning lawyers' availability to provide legal services,
while striking down regulations that merely furthered the self interest of
the legal profession.
3 5
This reasoning could be extended to cover activities that involve ex-
pressive associations with nonlawyers. Such an extension of the existing
law would recognize that the activities in question involve a broader defi-
nition of legal advice than traditionally recognized, including the com-
munication of information to clients in innovative ways.356 By focusing
on the expressive element of law firm diversification, business ventures
with nonlawyers may be viewed as alternative systems for making legal
services available. The current prophylactic rules, like the rule prohibit-
ing in-person solicitation of legal business, should give way to a more
narrow regulatory scheme designed to eliminate specific evils while pro-
tecting the expressive values of the conduct.
Since 1977, the Supreme Court has applied the commercial speech
doctrine to cases involving communications to prospective clients of law-
yers,3 57 rewriting the ethical rules on advertising in the process.35  As
previously stated, the commercial speech doctrine applies to lawyer as-
sociations as well as to individual lawyers.35 9 Underlying this doctrine is
the fundamental right of individuals to band together in associations for
commercial gain or to enhance their own collective interests. This form
of associational conduct differs from advertising and solicitation in that it
does not necessarily embody communication to third persons, i.e., pro-
spective clients. Such activities, which include the formation of ancillary
470 U.S. 274 (1985). Arguably, such parochial trade unionism has no place in the ethical
code of the legal profession.
354. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
355. See supra this part.
356. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
357. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1977).
358. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
359. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
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businesses to provide nonlegal services to clients of the law firm, may be
properly viewed as setting forth a philosophy about the nature of legal
services. Under this philosophy, legal services are viewed as an expres-
sive interest that deserves constitutional protection.36
Since Bates was decided in 1977, there has been a gradual expansion of
a lawyer's right to communicate that he or she is available to provide
legal services. 361 Today, all but the most offensive communications with
prospective clients are permissible.
The two cases that have grappled with the limits of client solicitation
are In re Primus,362 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.363 These com-
panion cases have been read to say that solicitation for pecuniary gain
may be prohibited while solicitation in the exercise of free speech is pro-
tected from regulation. This assessment is certainly the interpretation
given to these holdings in the Model Rules. 36  An argument can be
made, however, that this interpretation is not necessarily warranted.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Ohralik, recognized that the
state has the power to regulate commercial activity even when speech is a
component of the activity. 365  "The Rules prohibiting solicitation are
prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm before it
occurs. The Rules were applied in this case to discipline a lawyer for
soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to
result in the adverse consequences the State seeks to avert."' 366 And to
what consequences does this statement refer? The opinion goes on:
Although... personal solicitation... may apprise a victim of misfor-
tune of his legal rights, the very plight of that person ... makes him
more vulnerable to influence but also may make advice all the more
intrusive. Thus, under these adverse conditions the overtures of an
uninvited lawyer may distress the solicited individual simply because
of their obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual's privacy
360. The difference between the two theories discussed in this section lies in the fact
that under an association approach, the focus is on the right of lawyers to band together
to provide legal services. The commercial speech approach, meanwhile, extends the logic
of previously decided cases on legal advertising to cover expressive practice arrangements
such as ancillary businesses.
361. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91,
103-11 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476-80 (1988); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-49 (1985); In re LMJ., 455 U.S. 191,
199-207 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-84 (1977).
362. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
363. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
364. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3(a) (1991), reprinted in Thomas
D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 1992 Selected Standards On Professional Responsibil-
ity 97 (1992) ("A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit profes-
sional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or
prior professional relationship when a significant motive for... doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.").
365. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
366. Id at 464 (emphasis added).
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367
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall raised the question of
whether honest, unpressured commercial solicitation might not be per-
missible. 368 He would allow greater restriction of in-person solicitation
than printed advertising, but only to the degree necessary to prevent dan-
gers attendant to the conduct. 69
The companion case to Chralik, In re Primus,37 ° involved not only the
exercise of protected First Amendment rights, but a pristine course of
conduct in stark contrast to the lawyer in Ohralik.37 1 Although Primus
may be cited for the proposition that a lawyer may solicit clients pursu-
ant to the lawyer's First Amendment rights, no clue is provided concern-
ing the limits of intrusiveness in this situation. The Court simply stated
that political expression or association requires a different standard than
commercial conduct.3 7 2 Justice Rehnquist in dissent laments:
If Albert Ohralik, like Edna Primus, viewed litigation "not [as] a tech-
nique of resolving private differences," but as "a form of political ex-
pression" and "political association," for all that appears he would be
restored to his right to practice. And we may be sure that the next
lawyer in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct will
come here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of "political association"
to assure that insurance companies do not take unfair advantage of
policyholders.37 3
Since Ohralik and Primus were decided before the application
of the Central Hudson Gas test 3 4 to legal advertising in In re
367. Id. at 465.
368. See id. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("I believe it is open to doubt whether the
State's interests are sufficiently compelling to warrant the restriction on the free flow of
information which results from a sweeping nonsolicitation rule ....
369. See id. at 477 (Marshall, J., concurring).
370. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
371. Compare id. at 414-17 (lawyer may not be sanctioned for soliciting clients by mail
when the solicitation is not for pecuniary gain) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 449-52 (1978) (lawyer may be sanctioned for soliciting clients in person when
the solicitation is for pecuniary gain). What happens if Ohralik adopts Primus's behav-
ior, or vice versa?
372. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 434 ("The approach we adopt today in Ohralik, that the
State may proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely
to result in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to appellant's activities on behalf of
the ACLU.") (citation omitted).
373. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963)). The now Chief Justice has never been happy with
the direction of the Court in the legal advertising area, arguing since Bates that there is no
such thing as commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 404-05
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part). He now has sympathizers in Justices O'Connor
and Scalia. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
374. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980). In Central Hudson Gas, the Court articulated a four-step analysis for deter-
mining whether commercial speech is protected:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
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R.MJ ,37 it would make sense to reconsider solicitation under current
doctrine. In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,376 the Court struck down
the portion of Rule 7.3 that prohibited direct mail advertising, a form of
client contact only slightly less intrusive than in-person solicitation. 3"
Although Primus appears to require the same strict scrutiny of regula-
tions involving political expression and association as had existed before,
Ohralik is a different matter. If the important consideration in Ohralik is
intrusiveness rather than pecuniary gain (which may be viewed as a dis-
tinction between commercial expression and political expression), the
Central Hudson Gas test would seem to call for a different analysis.378
Clearly the state has a substantial interest in preventing highly intrusive
conduct by lawyers in obtaining clients.37 9 The regulatory scheme prob-
ably furthers that interest.3 0 It is highly probable that the state can fash-
ion a less restrictive formula than an absolute prohibition, for instance,
one that focusses on the specific evil to be prevented-intrusive over-
reaching by the lawyer.381
It is only a short step from the expressive considerations involved in
the advertising cases to the considerations inherent in law firm diversifi-
cation. If we accept the notion that there is an expressive element in
ancillary business activities, then it is necessary to balance the First
Amendment rights of lawyers with the state interests present. The Cen-
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.
1d.
375. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
376. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
377. See id. at 476 ("But merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents law-
yers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that
mode of protected commercial speech."). It should be further noted that direct-mail ad-
vertising is grouped conceptually with solicitation in Rule 7.3. See Model Rules, supra
note 7, Rule 7.3.
378. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
379. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978).
380. A prophylactic rule eliminates the danger of overreaching in solicitation by ban-
ning solicitation altogether. It also has the effect of extinguishing the lawyer's expressive
rights inherent in that conduct. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist might not like it any
more now than he did in his Primus dissent, many if not all forms of legal services contain
an element of public service that implicates First Amendment rights. See In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 442 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
381. Although Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477, 480 (1989), may represent
a retreat from the Central Hudson Gas least-restrictive-means test, see 447 U.S. at 566,
the new test, "a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective," Board of
Trustees, 492 U.S. at 480, may still disallow a prophylactic rule where less onerous alter-
natives are available. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia points out that this standard
is different from the rational basis test. See id.
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tral Hudson Gas test 38 2 provides an established calculus for ascertaining
the legitimacy of the regulatory scheme. Utilizing this test, the absolute
prohibitions in the rules governing affiliations with nonlawyers must fall
to a less restrictive paradigm. Specifically, it may be argued that other
provisions of the ethical code provide sufficient protection against the
anticipated evils.a 3 In any event, absent any strong policy justification
for the present rules other than the economic self interest of the legal
profession, a commercial speech challenge to the existing nonlawyer affil-
iation rules is desirable.
CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed recent developments concerning the ethical
rules governing lawyers' professional affiliations with nonlawyers. The
current debate appears intractable, and suggests that it will be difficult to
achieve a consensus on any proposal to reformulate the rules. At the
same time, market forces are producing with increasing regularity new
business ventures between lawyers and nonlawyers a84 Pressure on the
current rules can only be expected to increase in the future.
It is time to revisit the question of whether the rules should be chal-
lenged in court. Under an antitrust approach, the state action exemption
represents a serious problem because it shields the rules from attack.
Under a First Amendment approach, the freedom of association theory
is hampered by the possible application of a rational basis test of the
legitimacy of the state's regulatory scheme, while the commercial speech
theory is generally understood to apply to advertising rather than other
forms of conduct. In each case, an extension of the existing law is neces-
sary to successfully attack the rules.
Under the antitrust approach, however, there are substantial questions
concerning whether the state action exemption should apply to these
rules. If it does not apply, the case law involving other professions will
dictate the demise of the rules. Freedom of association and commercial
speech theories under the First Amendment, likewise, suggest that a less
restrictive alternative to the current prophylactic rules may be constitu-
tionally required.
Although challenges to the rules confront substantial obstacles, now is
the time to press the attack. As the marketplace for legal services be-
comes increasingly complex and competitive, lawyers need the freedom
382. See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566; supra note 374 and accompanying text.
383. Many potential problems could be obviated through informed consent of the par-
ties, adequate conflicts checks, screening devices to protect confidences, and other meth-
ods presently utilized in the practice of law in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Nemours
Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418, 428-29 (D. Del. 1986) (firm will not be disqualified
where lawyer with conflict of interest sets up a "cone of silence" and does not participate
in the case).
384. The image of the little Dutch boy trying to hold back the sea seems sadly suitable
to this situation.
[Vol. 61
1992] LAW FIRM DIVERSIFICATION 615
to experiment with new delivery systems in order to survive. Ethical
rules governing conflicts of interests, candor, confidentiality and other
matters apply to lawyers in whatever they do, and such rules, if vigor-
ously enforced, are sufficient to protect the interests of clients, individual
lawyers and the legal profession. We do not need and can ill-afford
archaic rules designed merely to maintain the economic hegemony of the
legal profession, especially when those rules have become counterproduc-
tive to their original purpose.

